Hackers Impersonate Major Defense Companies to Spread GravityRAT Spyware and Steal Sensitive Data

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Hackers are using the logos of major defense and aerospace companies on a fake recruitment website to spread GravityRAT spyware.

The site promises connections to overseas employers and offers an Android résumé builder that can steal text messages, location data, and files.

Lockheed Martin, Airbus, and BAE Systems are among the brands displayed as supposed clients. Their logos are part of the lure, not evidence that the companies were breached or involved.

The campaign appears to focus on people in India seeking jobs with foreign defense contractors. Mobile security data showed GravityRAT detections on 14 devices in India over a 12-month period.

That figure reflects what researchers could see, not the total number of infections. Defense and military personnel in other countries may also be targets, but the public report did not confirm infections outside India.

Researchers from Lookout identified the active campaign and detailed their findings in a November 12 threat report. They traced GravityRAT back to at least 2015 and linked it to Pakistan-aligned threat actors tracked as SpaceCobra and Cosmic Leopard.

The spyware began as a Windows tool before expanding to Android and macOS, an evolution covered in our earlier reporting on GravityRAT’s cross-platform expansion as researchers uncovered versions targeting more devices.

Hackers Impersonate Major Defense Companies to Spread GravityRAT Spyware

The site calls itself “Global Recruiter” and offers automated résumé tools alongside promises of job connections. Its “Our Clients” section displays nine company logos, including those of Thales, Rheinmetall, Northrop Grumman, Saab, Rolls-Royce, and Safran.

The use of a fake defense recruitment portal echoes a separate Nimbus Manticore campaign that targeted aerospace and defense professionals. Here, the download is GlobalRecruiters.apk, an Android app with the package name com.resumee.resumebuilder.

Legitimate distributors (Source - Lookout)
Legitimate distributors (Source – Lookout)

The Google Play button does not open the official store. Instead, a pop-up claims the app is under review and asks visitors to download the Android package directly.

The message makes sideloading, or installing an app outside the store, sound like a temporary workaround. Researchers found no evidence that the apps they analyzed were distributed through Google Play.

Similar fake Play Store prompts have been used in other Android spyware campaigns, though GravityRAT’s operators framed the download as part of a job search rather than a software update.

The researchers also found a related Windows lure called DropDeckX by examining domains that shared registration dates and name servers with the mobile campaign.

DropDeckX was advertised as a cloud storage utility, but the analyzed sample could collect credentials and system information, stay on the device through Windows Task Scheduler, and download additional malware.

Lookout said similar variants have been tracked as HeavyLift. The finding shows the operation was not limited to Android downloads.

What GravityRAT Steals and How to Spot It

GravityRAT can upload collected data to servers controlled by its operators at intervals ranging from one to 30 minutes. It can collect contacts, incoming and outgoing call logs, missed calls, past and current SMS messages, and GPS coordinates.

It can also take documents, photos, audio files, Wi-Fi network details, device account information, and the phone’s IMEI, a hardware identifier. That combination can reveal who a target communicates with, where they go, and what they keep on their phone.

Earlier reporting on GravityRAT’s WhatsApp backup theft documented a capability that persists in this campaign. Lookout found that the spyware targets encrypted backup files with extensions including .crypt12, .crypt13, .crypt14, .crypt18, and .crypt32.

Copying an encrypted backup is not the same as decrypting it. The public report identifies the files GravityRAT can collect, but does not establish that the operators could read the contents of stolen backups.

Live distribution websites identified (Source - Lookout)
Live distribution websites identified (Source – Lookout)

Job seekers should verify vacancies through the employer’s official careers page and treat requests to install a résumé or interview app outside an official store as a warning sign. Defense organizations can use the indicators below to check app inventories, endpoint records, and network logs.

An installed package or a matching file hash is a stronger lead than a DNS lookup alone, which does not show that someone installed the app. Anyone who installed the fake recruiter app on a device used for work should report it promptly to their security team.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Indicator type Value
SHA-1 ce2ce25cbe461af221cf215b3c67bf531cf74855
SHA-1 1567801b0614d814ea681867891d2fb4c68a5f3b
SHA-1 4b1c78f35510f77d896014cabbed8bfd3c5a4fdf
SHA-1 c48b72f248f4ffea3e2dc960331a19556acb9256
SHA-1 a80af5b2f0c5ff71e4384dc273822eda28068878
SHA-1 10a8fcb42993fa75310a4767c03d89c5aac86e10
SHA-1 1aba3697a090e0be0dc8dbab4987c6bc585629ef
SHA-1 14a2177bf319f1d592b31153ab39526312c939ae
SHA-1 bbbdcb8a7f25c1b1345f54c95049eb8b1cea10ab
SHA-1 86683d68c942326d9f547bd6878a4da43e9eceb3
SHA-1 9ffe46c3a2c8b3131084e881e0cd2554e2d7f93d
Domain recruitersglobal[.]net
Domain movie-date[.]net
Domain dock-sync[.]com
Domain dropdeckx[.]com
Domain linkuptoday[.]net
Domain androiddevpool[.]com
Domain androidannotations[.]com
Domain androidwebsys[.]com
Domain androidasynclib[.]com
Domain androidufslib[.]com
Domain androidstaticserve[.]com
Domain cloudupnext[.]com
Domain myvaultz[.]com
Domain chatnplay[.]in
Android filename GlobalRecruiters.apk
Android package com.resumee.resumebuilder
GravityRAT C2 endpoint an-east.androidannotations[.]com/vanilla/B67j96dg.php
GravityRAT C2 endpoint api.androidwebsys[.]com/delta/X25r87Nf.php
GravityRAT C2 endpoint meta.androidasynclib[.]com/azure/H54F257gd4.php
GravityRAT C2 endpoint static.androidufslib[.]com/hotel/H28j75Ft.php
GravityRAT C2 endpoint connectivity.androidstaticserve[.]com/blue/B67j96dg.php
GravityRAT C2 endpoint api.androiddevpool[.]com/mike/B67j96dg.php
DropDeckX C2 host web.dropdeckx[.]com

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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