Google Reveals How Russian Hackers Used One Cloud Breach to Compromise Another US Organization

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Russian state-sponsored hackers broke into a U.S. organization’s Google Workspace environment in late 2025, stole its staff directory and cloud files, and used information from the breach to target a second U.S. organization in 2026.

Google and Mandiant said the hackers posed as an employee of the first victim, turning a familiar professional identity into a way to steal cloud credentials from the second. Neither organization was named.

In its November 17 case study, Google identified the group as COLD RELIC, previously tracked as COLDRIVER and also known as Star Blizzard or Callisto.

The U.S. Justice Department has tied Callisto to Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB. Google’s researchers said they saw evidence of fresh phishing activity as recently as November 2026.

Google Cloud researchers previously identified the group’s LOSTKEYS document theft malware in a separate 2025 campaign. The new report does not identify a malware payload in either U.S. breach.

Instead, it shows how stolen credentials, unauthorized authentication methods, and convincing impersonation were enough to steal cloud files and reach another organization.

Google Reveals How Russian Hackers Used One Cloud Breach

The first intrusion began with stolen credentials for a Google Workspace Super Admin account. The attackers sent repeated multi-factor authentication (MFA) prompts until the user approved one, a tactic known as MFA fatigue.

They signed in through a residential proxy near the victim, making the connection look geographically routine. Once inside, they registered a device model the organization had not seen before.

With administrator access, the group downloaded the organization’s entire cloud drive, both by retrieving files directly and by sharing them with an attacker-controlled email account.

The hackers also exported the staff directory, started a tenant-wide Google Workspace Customer Takeout export, and deleted security alerts.

Some attacker-enrolled passkeys remained usable after password and session resets because responders had not revoked the passkeys themselves.

Once removed from the first organization’s systems, the hackers used accounts impersonating its employees to approach staff and professional contacts.

Social engineering conversation (Source – Google Cloud)

That tactic fits a pattern seen in earlier Star Blizzard campaigns, where the group opened with what looked like ordinary professional correspondence. In the second U.S. breach, the conversation began on an encrypted messaging app, not in the victim’s work inbox.

Previously targeted WhatsApp

The group had previously targeted WhatsApp with malicious QR codes, but Google did not name the messaging app in this case.

Investigators found a stronger link between the two breaches: a phishing redirect submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026 contained a reference to the first organization, matching the identity the hackers used in the chat.

The phishing links targeted Microsoft Entra ID, which the second organization used for single sign-on to Google Workspace. That setup lets staff use their Microsoft identity to access Google services.

After stealing login information, the hackers added an MFA device and downloaded files available to the compromised user. Unlike the first breach, Google did not report an organization-wide drive theft in the second.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Indicator or activity What defenders should look for
MFA fatigue Repeated failed sign-ins or MFA challenges followed by a successful sign-in from the same IP
Unauthorized device or passkey Device Registered or Passkey enrolled events after unusual sign-in activity
Backup code use Backup code as the login challenge type from an unexpected network
Tenant-wide export CUSTOMER_TAKEOUT_CREATED in Workspace Admin logs
Bulk downloads or external sharing Spikes in Drive Download events or files marked shared_externally
OAuth mail access An Authorize event granting broad mail access to an unapproved client
Alert tampering or audit queries Unexpected Batch Delete Operation Performed or Investigation Query events
Staff directory export User List Download from an unfamiliar device
Sensitive file searches Item search performed events involving .pst, .bak, or credential-related terms
Residential network examples AS5650 and AS20115; Google cites them as examples for network controls, not dedicated attacker infrastructure

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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