Hackers Exploit Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers to Deploy Custom RATs Across Southeast Asia

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Hackers are exploiting unpatched Microsoft Exchange servers and vulnerable web servers to break into government networks across Southeast Asia, deploying custom remote access trojans built for quiet, long-term spying.

The campaign combines server exploitation, targeted phishing, credential theft, and mailbox access to pursue sensitive government information.

The activity has targeted government entities since at least July 2025. Investigators observed attackers deploying PerfectPioneer RAT before introducing its modular successor, KUKURAT, in March 2026.

The operation focused on maintaining access and collecting intelligence, with targeted filenames suggesting an interest in international relations and internal political affairs.

Researchers from Unit 42 identified both previously undocumented malware families and tracked the campaign as TGR-STA-0049, also known as REF7707, Earth Alux, and Ink Dragon.

The investigation shows how the attackers steadily updated their tools while combining familiar intrusion methods with newer ways to hide network traffic and endpoint activity.

Hackers Exploit Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers

Server exploitation was the primary entry method. Attackers compromised vulnerable Exchange and web servers, planted web shells, and used that access to run reconnaissance commands and deploy malware.

The report does not identify the specific Exchange vulnerabilities exploited, so the intrusions should not be attributed to a particular CVE or exploit chain.

The approach echoes earlier Exchange server backdoor attacks involving other threat groups, although those incidents do not establish a connection to this campaign.

Execution of the PerfectPioneer RAT from a web shell, as shown in Cortex XDR (Source - Unit42)
Execution of the PerfectPioneer RAT from a web shell, as shown in Cortex XDR (Source – Unit42)

Here, researchers observed a mixture of custom and publicly available web shells, including ASPXSpy, Godzilla, and Suo5 variants. Phishing provided a second route into targeted systems.

Attackers used lookalike government domains and executable files disguised with PDF icons. Opening these files launched malware alongside a decoy document.

One lure impersonated an official Myanmar election notice, while another delivery method ran a genuine GlobalProtect installer as malware executed in the background.

PerfectPioneer is written in Go, and researchers recovered six variants. The most complete version supports file transfers, shell commands, process management, screenshots, keylogging, code injection, and SOCKS5 proxying.

Some variants also contain an operator safety mechanism that blocks destructive or conspicuous commands, reducing the chance that an attacker’s mistake exposes the intrusion.

Both malware families support HTTP/3 communications over QUIC, which uses UDP rather than TCP. This matters because some network defenses inspect TCP traffic more closely than UDP traffic.

PerfectPioneer’s analyzed communication framework can fall back to HTTP/2, while KUKURAT has separate HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 variants. Blocking QUIC alone therefore does not remove the threat.

KUKURAT Hides Activity While Attackers Steal Credentials and Email

KUKURAT shifts most capabilities into separate DLL modules retrieved from the command server when needed. Written in C++, its code supports at least 12 named modules covering functions such as screenshots, keylogging, file management, scanning, remote execution, and lateral movement. This separates the small core agent from much of its operational functionality.

Unlike the distinct TinyRCT government espionage campaign, this operation also features a coordinated camouflage engine. KUKURAT can generate harmless-looking web requests, imitate browser-related registry activity, and rapidly create and delete temporary files.

Code snippet from the PerfectPioneer RAT’s isDangerousCommand code (Source - Unit42)
Code snippet from the PerfectPioneer RAT’s isDangerousCommand code (Source – Unit42)

These actions aim to bury meaningful signals among artificial noise rather than simply conceal a single malicious file. Attackers also deployed a watchdog component that could restart KUKURAT after it stopped responding.

After compromising domain controllers, they modified domain log-on scripts so legitimate user authentication triggered malware downloads and execution on additional endpoints. Researchers also observed the use of established remote administration methods for movement inside compromised networks.

Credential theft included LSASS memory dumping, DCSync, Mimikatz, ProcDump, and SharpDPAPI. The attackers then examined Exchange impersonation rights and, in observed cases, granted a compromised account broad mailbox access.

Their document collection targeted office files, PDFs, and images, linking endpoint compromise directly to the campaign’s intelligence-gathering objective.

The pattern reinforces lessons from other Exchange server exploitation campaigns without implying shared attribution. Defenders should patch exposed servers, investigate existing compromises, audit domain log-on scripts, and review Exchange permissions.

Unit 42 additionally recommends inspecting or restricting QUIC traffic and monitoring suspicious credential-dumping behavior.

Removing malware without addressing stolen credentials, mailbox permissions, and domain persistence may leave attackers with routes back into the environment.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Component SHA-256
PerfectPioneer — RatAAkk-tt 2281e754f70e11298db1a0a7c1b527cf2b5eec2056d4c73a46ed572ab873dc6e
9721d65ee7695db2b3dc3705f5d8e5efe3a478c3b6d1704d66daf77fe95aeb0d
d725ad8b523c94f99fca9e72a650e835dca47b9ebe7610d6c4eb3525d410c365
PerfectPioneer — PerfectRAT f4c9d5d13c1a09533876a02f6fa04831efbf600b05cfb3ed765a0ebde82b0457
19bb3012d846f3672fb98dad0449ae5c267ab30150800b2f1559036564c7d0b8
PerfectPioneer — rat_http3_ls 92fb9545ea49e2fb4635fce1859ff3f609738be75f85d146614243fc8bc80b67
PerfectPioneer — Pioneer decoy installer ab06f540ecdd1d45491aa71bfc04c80852371c8f5cd43b9a6ebb53f1e1b69588
PerfectPioneer — Pioneer core agents bf59f8d7ef79b09a72bbb9c05ca8746466d03226a3779cc1096ba067117ca008
8bf9401990d3255d1022a25884b02ee75ef01bd1a729d29ff52de2e5f0d637a2
PerfectPioneer — newhttp3 modified host binary 5f857ff78bfbef2a55a846fc93744e11e07a9b72ee3fc3bc345c32ce9615ddee
PerfectPioneer — newhttp3 loader DLL 61f7e2f4159c566578e88cb05cdf49e4378f45ebddbd332224e97c11df922120
PerfectPioneer — newhttp3 core agents 5b7effbf0465c05e8dc9a8fea69b000a78237735ea0b854e8d9baee5b7af8344
cd8f43da32849584751eec884cf7e3208eb0a71108197a32e9bb248612e757d2
7541222a1316ec54bf9c8660b923e1d0490a925b2ee92060b1567be7cb1bde4b
cffcd6f2589d3ab4f3693805d1752b7c328a00cc543dd02b129763e179c3f311
5805cb5b0a6fb738ef7c1873b8e5de4281c36c7f440f28717fa9f441c5e0ef17
a6a9ccffadd00b0e75e913b0f851b1f834fd20588df8b89759d9ae49a48c8e10
PerfectPioneer — rat_http3_cc modified host binaries b975f5932c04b381f8fa58a3303194f1aff950d3c6cd12dcc1d323bb3393718b
904409ce8846394e1fe9a5ce37f2265cbf6933611278ae57fdf5fa74759af2bb
d700b573ea8387efad633a70124b7a2a3aece844a267157b1cb55be7b62f3b67
52d3442fb26023ebc0bc76542b56be88d1c3327c8bcedf1dcb95f80511527f07
PerfectPioneer — rat_http3_cc loader DLL 8cfe629fc08ae06c8ba106113ba30bb16fa2fbbf8bd3dd6831d16b031e0ebe70
PerfectPioneer — rat_http3_cc core agents 619b749e1c6634d38f15c51005a4237e9076aaaf36927b562a990e8bc34fdfcb
fb5b0b1d083d6f6afa90948bd1fd1a498b51dd3f6dc7f90a02a2a17818756563
183abf82951c2052e9a1829c70c173c11756e8df0e86c8071c27df0988caeaa0
PerfectPioneer — unknown variant 0533365accbba405757de7eb486533c11c8e0510a28d414ee8c5e6b8a41ed97b
3cb5376a5e6c0fcbd6844ab76f3dc73a42da7ecee6ecaaef285d4abe33964fa1
f5ebe85418655d75d1a760543858846db1478a060875fd19ddaa5e2febc038d7
PerfectPioneer — unknown variant modified host binaries b5bea4d8b94fbb39ac992e8e763680af6f39d12d42e264b43431fb61cf7b9a88
7745523939fc6b31b6a73d8ca1f363c62438b6eef56f6fe8c39e71fcd14b65f4
PerfectPioneer — loader DLL components 0c49e1b98a236d3391740473101b66dd48c719fa4112dbef3816b56bce58e6e7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 — additional variants c4b4647795567ab15528edd1ab1bf37fb50e21b442e59a653051061973e87c02
bf8afbd1c2074c7cd6ff8b86dbe67a57ca5594817e46b24e226b71c4edde7697
KUKURAT — HTTP/3 b8dca1c7e7a74ce82ab4e4cad9b718a458735d2c6c956e4cf3109aac59bfd0e4
9fb0976fcd1f92c4711726a91cff8be9a39944efedc4caf2d80f935327f8f490
KUKURAT — HTTP/2 7225ef57161cf0908560811be798d22e9354c071d576540a43aa7900784c0688
a214d264c6bb0d2ba89986f73e196ea200307574745a245fc42c32fbef4cc140
662dc73e11b60b2f12c94b6b68da45de7bffece4b1dcc75679ed020629d0705d
KUKURAT — watchdog b062b4d8c19baf5c1568e28b3e0a5e2318e9501ea61ddfe804d9755c1bdbf887
KUKURAT — PsExecService.exe module 34cc9bc4a533b91e7cdb30fecc57ba609dc890780fd13ecfbc253047b3b37b78
SharpDPAPI 0cbde9b7f59dafca80f214121a04eda7804b920da28ce1c06939a4783e6b097f
cdc9757294d3063eb10c9a37d1d945d31f6857c652b864803815406b02eeefbf
Unmapped files 82a989c728db4e09a2b85a4a55f7663cefa62844632cb16dcda5ca70bf09a8a5
71d897427329ca14dd621e777046dc35f3d9dc870d3b13a56125125391a56afe
6781f84417d0056df95ed38b3e7a6b49312d30119470356f6923238d49de3490
dd02d28c48cf5cabd35a0b32e05e7c99ff0de35541201026ae36c59e54968c78
e59b08eb03ffa10ccf9103d171af757308e6d43519c4e904ef5e0929ef92d8fd
Web shells 99f571c07170250a84f0ae9de4179044df91244855d9b39978729933ea3d438f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 category Values
PerfectPioneer command-and-control domains www.maui-cocktailbar[.]com
ads-edge[.]com
www.wkuyda[.]com
www.thailisting[.]net
www.yangon.it[.]com
KUKURAT command-and-control domains www.cloudflacecdn[.]com
www.police.gr[.]com
www.investigationj6[.]com
Additional domain listed by the source www.sacofficegov[.]com
IP addresses 27.254.164[.]212
27.254.164[.]209

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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