Hackers Use Fake Shipment ZIP Files and DLL Side-Loading to Deploy PureLogs and PureRAT Malware

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Hackers are using a shipment-themed ZIP archive to launch a Windows malware chain that combines a legitimate signed application, DLL side-loading, and hidden Python code.

The attack disguises its components as shipping material, images, documents, and a browser updater before running a payload linked to PureLogs and PureRAT infrastructure.

The case shows why a trusted digital signature does not make an entire software package safe. Here, the genuine application acts as the starting point, while a malicious library beside it drives execution.

Similar business email malware campaigns have used delivery complaints and download lures to distribute these malware families, although the supplied findings do not establish a connection between those operations.

Researchers from Unit 42, Shazan Khaja and Muhammet Algan, documented the activity in research dated November 16, 2026. They observed the infection chain on October 21 after a user downloaded the shipment-themed archive.

Their findings trace execution from the extracted files to a decoded Windows payload communicating with infrastructure attributed to PureLogs and PureRAT campaigns.

Hackers Use Fake Shipment ZIP Files and DLL Side-Loading

Inside the archive, attackers placed a legitimate, validly signed, 32-bit Kingsoft PDF executable renamed to match the shipment lure. A malicious DLL sat alongside it.

When the user launched the executable, Windows loaded that nearby library, handing control to attacker-supplied code without requiring changes to the signed program itself.

The sequence unfolded within seconds. Windows Explorer wrote the DLL to disk at 03:02:53 UTC, consistent with archive extraction. The renamed application started at 03:03:06 and loaded the malicious library roughly one second later.

Archive extraction for the next stage began at 03:03:09, showing how quickly execution followed the user’s action. This approach resembles other trusted application side-loading attacks in which genuine software loads a hostile neighboring library.

However, the Kingsoft executable’s signature and hash are not evidence of infection on their own. Investigators need to examine its location, loaded libraries, and child processes rather than treating every copy as malicious.

The DLL launched a command sequence that opened a decoy PDF while preparing the hidden payload. A signed WinRAR command-line program, disguised with an image extension, extracted a password-protected archive into the public user directory.

The extracted package contained a Python runtime renamed to resemble Microsoft’s Edge updater. Several internal filenames used Korean-language phrases about chicken deliveries and refrigerator stock, unrelated to the shipment story.

These strings help describe the package, but they do not establish the attackers’ identity or the victims’ location. The supplied research does not identify a threat actor or explain how the download link reached the user.

Disguised Python Loader Decodes the Final Payload

The renamed Python interpreter executed a one-line command that read another apparent PDF as raw bytes. Instead of displaying a document, it applied a repeating XOR key to recover Python code and passed that result to exec().

The document extension therefore concealed an encoded script rather than readable shipment information. The recovered script used randomized names and arithmetic expressions involving XOR, shifts, and addition to obscure its contents.

It then decoded a large Base64 blob and applied another repeating XOR operation, producing a Windows Portable Executable file with an MZ header. These layers separated the visible lure from the final executable payload.

Earlier reporting on Python DLL side-loading techniques provides context for this combination of trusted software and script execution. In this case, the decoded payload contacted the infrastructure listed below over TLSv1 on port 443.

Unit 42’s findings associate that infrastructure with PureLogs and PureRAT campaigns, rather than independently proving that both families executed on the observed endpoint.

For defenders, the strongest leads are behavioral: a signed application running from Downloads and loading a neighboring DLL, followed by command-shell activity, disguised archive extraction, and Python execution from a public directory.

A Python command that decodes an apparent document and immediately executes its contents is another important investigation lead.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Context
DLL SHA-256 7453f86a9b36a0067b37cf00627ae6195b9eeee9e64a58653a80069eae7bd6fa Side-loaded DLL
Payload SHA-256 91ca4a96289fae34fb441a41d836e9a61ba8d2cfe6a12a8d345c521a4ddeebd3 Decoded executable
C2 domain tea.vexexo[.]com Payload destination
C2 address 185.139.214[.]102:443 TLSv1 traffic
ZIP archive Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.zip Initial download
Renamed executable Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4.exe Legitimate wpspdf.exe
DLL path Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4Shipment_Condition_And_Check_mp4krpt.dll Extracted malicious library
Decoy document xdocument.pdf Displayed during execution
Disguised extractor xQK_참외_냉장고재고현황_2019.png WinRAR command-line binary
Protected archive OP_2023년_치킨뼈분석표_그냥요.dat Contains Python runtime
Encoded script QK_2021년_치킨배달대기시간_됩니까.pdf XOR-encoded Python
Runtime path C:UsersPublicMicrosoftEdgeUpdateMicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe Renamed Python interpreter
Archive password Q8vSrgVhuATe2S5FyubuEDUkFUnaYR8PzzU663RgBbtRPujyDADfm Extraction password
Script XOR key, hex d9301f099d9dd27cc9a1c190e40719cfaff77f65 First decoding stage
Payload XOR key, Base64 mq8/qZ7D/RkPOCbLyUUBs+wCuA== Final decoding stage

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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