Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without Passwords

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Hackers gained administrator access to an internet-facing Temenos Quantum Fabric deployment without a password and used the banking platform’s own tools to install malicious Java components.

The campaign, dubbed BankWeaver, turned a service that should have been private into a route to the application server and its connected systems. Investigators confirmed one compromise at a financial services institution.

Six other banks across Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and the Americas appeared to have the same configuration and internet exposure. Investigators did not confirm that any of those six banks were compromised.

The suspected exposure matters because Quantum Fabric, formerly Kony Fabric, links customer-facing web and mobile apps to identity systems, payment services, databases, and customer records.

Researchers from Forescout’s Vedere Labs identified the malware while investigating the breach in early September. In its November 19 report, Forescout named the two components FabricShell and FabricShadow.

One let the attackers run commands and query databases; the other gathered information about the server and sent it out of the network.

Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform

Forescout traced the intrusion to a Fabric authentication service that issued privileged tokens but was configured to accept anonymous access.

A token is a digital credential that tells a service what its holder is allowed to do. Here, a token meant for anonymous application access was accepted across an administrative trust boundary. The attackers gained administrator privileges without supplying valid login credentials.

With those privileges, the attackers abused Fabric’s support for custom Java integrations. The platform loaded the malicious code as part of its normal service framework, giving it access to the application’s network and database connections.

Earlier reporting on VMware vCenter web shells describes a separate campaign in which attackers also planted backdoors in enterprise infrastructure.

FabricShell was registered as a Fabric service. It could run operating system commands, return their output, and submit database queries.

Forescout found hardcoded PostgreSQL connection details tied to another victim, raising the possibility of both reading and modifying data.

Attack flow (Source - Forescout)
Attack flow (Source – Forescout)

That capability is not proof that customer records were stolen. Separate reporting on Lazarus IIS web shells shows how similar tools can combine server control with database access.

FabricShadow ran before the application processed data requests. It collected details such as the hostname, network interfaces, Java version, and service account, then saved a local copy and sent the findings to remote infrastructure.

Forescout identified more than 30 IP addresses used during the campaign and said the operators routed activity through compromised devices and victim servers.

Access configuration

Temenos attributed the behavior to the access configuration, according to Forescout. The vendor released updates and guidance to make the service private and advised customers to restrict internet access to Spotlight and Fabric’s administrative and authentication services.

Closing that route prevents the same exposure from being abused again, but it does not remove an implant already installed.

Defenders should check for unexpected Java package registrations, service imports, and application publishing events. Java or Tomcat launching shells, downloaders, or network utilities is another signal worth investigating alongside outbound traffic and application logs.

Earlier NSA web shell guidance likewise stresses checking both internal and internet-facing servers for persistent backdoors.

Where investigators find signs of compromise, Forescout recommends preserving logs, memory, and suspicious packages before cleanup, revoking active sessions, rotating exposed credentials, and rebuilding affected nodes from known-good images.

The key check before restoring service is whether anonymous access is confined to its intended public workflow and can no longer yield administrative privileges.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Category Indicator Context
Payload hosting sendit[.]sh, temp[.]sh, plainraw[.]com, 37.187.78[.]41 Listed in Forescout’s IoC table
Additional hosting reference plainraw[.]sh Named separately in the report’s narrative
Service and code artifacts ReconJavaService, recon.ReconService, ReconPreProcessor, recon_svc.jar Hunt in Fabric service records and Java packages
Host artifacts shell.sh, shell<number>.sh, /tmp/.recon_out Script names and a local reconnaissance output file
Content markers RECON_PREPROCESSOR, RECON_DONE, RECON_ERR, RECON_FROM_FABRIC, X-A: k1 Look for matches in files, logs, and captured traffic
Outbound ports 5005, 5006, 25565 Forescout recommends investigating unexpected use from middleware servers
File hashes Not published No SHA-256, SHA-1, or MD5 values provided

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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