Hackers Use AI-Assisted PowerShell Toolkit With 41 Modules to Target African Stock Exchange

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Hackers ran 41 PowerShell modules on a compromised server at a major African stock exchange in just three minutes and 12 seconds.

The toolkit searched for passwords, cloud keys, and database credentials, then tested whether it could access the exchange’s investment application programming interface (API) and a securities depository gateway.

The exchange was not named, and investigators could not determine whether any of the credentials worked. The activity took place on September 20, 2026.

A web shell, a script that lets someone issue commands on a compromised server, ran the modules through Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS).

Earlier reporting on a suspected AI-written PowerShell backdoor documented a different use of AI-assisted scripting: maintaining remote access. At the exchange, the scripts focused on finding and testing credentials across several systems.

Researchers from Symantec identified the toolkit and detailed it in their November 19 report. They found repeated code patterns consistent with AI assistance but could not identify a model or prove how the scripts were written.

They also found six implants designed to maintain access on the same server, a separate finding that complicated efforts to establish who ran the toolkit.

Hackers Use AI-Assisted PowerShell Toolkit With 41 Modules

The modules searched shared policy folders and directories belonging to six business applications. They looked for Amazon Web Services (AWS) keys and database connection strings, which can contain the details an application needs to sign in to a database.

Other modules mapped SharePoint sites, software management servers, and source code infrastructure. A separate case involving AI-assisted Active Directory reconnaissance showed how a PowerShell script could map a Windows network.

Here, the toolkit also reached into cloud and financial systems. Four modules focused on financial interfaces. The operators tried a guessed password, reused a bearer token, and tested API keys against the securities depository gateway.

A bearer token can grant access to whoever presents it while it remains valid. The operators also checked a specific investor number.

Symantec said the choice of targets could point to financial motives, but the investor lookup and interest in internal information meant espionage could not be ruled out.

Modular Toolkit (Source - Symantec)
Modular Toolkit (Source – Symantec)

All 41 modules used the same basic script structure, error handling, and code for sending results through Domain Name System (DNS) queries.

That consistency was one reason researchers suspected AI assistance: a developer building a single toolkit might put the repeated code in a shared function instead.

Coverage of generative AI malware development puts the finding in context, but neither repeated code nor rapid execution proves a model wrote the scripts. The pace shows automation, not authorship.

The modules sent encoded output through DNS lookups to a public security testing service. Previous reporting on DNS malware delivery techniques examined a different use of the protocol: delivering malware rather than sending script output.

In the exchange case, Symantec could not see what the remote collector received. Researchers found no evidence of data theft or privilege escalation, but that visibility gap meant they could not determine whether the credential tests succeeded.

Symantec attributed the six persistence implants to Witchetty, a China-linked espionage group, with high confidence. It did not attribute the PowerShell toolkit to the group.

The earliest evidence of malicious activity on the server dated to April 2026, though access may have begun earlier. Symantec had previously reported that Witchetty targeted the same exchange in 2022.

That history makes the overlap worth investigating, but it does not establish who ran the September scripts or how they gained access.

For security teams, the clearest signal is the combination of events: a web server worker process launching PowerShell, unusual DNS queries soon afterward, and attempts to access sensitive APIs.

Investigators can compare endpoint, DNS, and authentication logs to see whether those events occurred together and whether any tested credentials were accepted.

A matching file hash can help identify a known sample, but finding a Witchetty implant does not, on its own, connect that host to the 41-module toolkit.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Source description
SHA-256 8940de2ada979ad2c53ece0b5cb84100c4df0a024b4b363e96cb6a67469e30d5 Mimikatz
SHA-256 5c4f6e21877dfd71e3e95254c6193457e9aab10aca7459ddaeb6d711997190de Loader
SHA-256 982750f4f9edd2ef51b9972a1018a8777bd9d65e0d2e43977a522bdc73ddef5f Persistence implant associated with Avast wsc_proxy
SHA-256 1363534d205ad60f6700d81f2af2c0ce6d959b73fd405adbb598072395bd26e5 ShellcodeLoader persistence implant
SHA-256 0ad7e39ce6b9b7637a002c352637089f6ccf8ae39206a7d895266b21ca26ff0f RC4-encrypted loader
SHA-256 2e223e3c6dc7a130f0281a6c608cd58c153ec026c020c8a661b60a1e285140bf Utility associated with beacon.bin and Default.xml
SHA-256 5a2f093f7ae25c5e381647549496acf375e18dd95263b921518e340ee78e5377 DLL loader associated with svchost.exe and WindowsUpdate.xml
SHA-256 b1155f47910f032217352c3a302c01de4d15cabda34331d2866f5d7a52b3ecde Loader associated with svchost.exe
SHA-256 b737eae170534f5965b90f4af807cb3f728498f3bccc9355a0afc0171e413230 Loader associated with svchost.exe
SHA-256 5fd9a352d1bec4a11134ee140aa278d07d720b45493a7f01a548293f412972ce Loader associated with svchost.exe
SHA-256 242c411cd415d55e67aae75759e5c07720fcdddc0378b5e35d4c1e4ab2b01eb8 Loader associated with svchost.exe
SHA-256 af3737ba032b8c5d3403064899ab6cc48610a397d9f67b626f99b2f0f5082202 Loader associated with VSPerfCmd.exe
SHA-256 6b3061d6e042744bb484b725031e7916b31ad224318a8c0441b9ead14ab853d5 DLL loader associated with setting.dat
SHA-256 9b4dadaa55479727f7c0034ff9c07165597b9a9a9376b6e564634eeaf1c6b876 DLL loader associated with setting.dat
SHA-256 d732660db5af253aacbc580d6114d59d233c48b3a5ead6dcfcb55246252abed2 DLL loader associated with setting.dat
SHA-256 85e75e78a545d2fe11ac19385cc8c0789e1056a2cd4edfec32a6a6b113001e5a Loader associated with mfeann.log
SHA-256 1c1704d789332c4d6ce57139d27194ac64c27bfbb1368f1006ffc3c96f3bcb80 Nim-compiled DLL impersonating VSPMsg.dll; loader for Msg.log
SHA-256 3ca9d65046420592e726776bb26b08719721d108f6947fd22af1d5e7cac33edc Cobalt Strike beacon
SHA-256 30dc80cb4c791d80eb21597232fb2f5a4111bf3dfad32c736b789d77127310ef Cobalt Strike beacon
SHA-256 152c125eacdacc69406b120afd95994eef0f7a0cd638c2d8723e64f79344a336 Cobalt Strike beacon
SHA-256 8129e103509f00f40a6a2740b76bc3f9449ac09cd9222ba289e52e86f31f616e Cobalt Strike beacon
SHA-256 26dc22c99e5e88363818e56dc5883258f048e426c9aa515887bf5d06872782f9 Not available for analysis
SHA-256 53ddb6c51aca4bd6b00ed83a8019ee1440351f8eeb95a7b6c74a2b75210d85b2 Not available for analysis
SHA-256 af295b5081ccdfd601a0aaecaa81fe1aa92125b548063863dbca2011cef658ce Not available for analysis
SHA-256 0f2c40d31887418de304ca182afb4f4fecfe95937068f11fc798778c2ca95e3f mfeann.exe
SHA-256 002ce0d28ec990aadbbc89df457189de37d8adaadc9c084b78eb7be9a9820c81 vsperfcmd.exe
Domain danoam334iqjo0ap2scg6ofosjxfgqhsa[.]oast[.]pro DNS destination associated with toolkit output

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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