Hackers Exploit Microsoft 365 Device Code Authentication to Hijack Accounts and Bypass MFA

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Hackers are targeting Microsoft 365 accounts with fake payment notices and SharePoint documents that lead employees to a genuine Microsoft sign-in page.

The November 2026 campaigns turn a routine task, such as checking whether an invoice was paid, into an authorization request that can give an attacker access to the employee’s account.

The trick does not require breaking multifactor authentication (MFA) or stealing a password. As earlier coverage of Microsoft device code phishing showed, a real Microsoft sign-in page can still be part of a phishing attack.

The employee may complete every security prompt correctly while unknowingly authorizing a session the attacker started.

Researchers at Hornetsecurity’s Threat Intelligence Lab identified malicious HTML and SVG attachments in several payment-themed campaigns.

The attachments redirected recipients or displayed phishing content; the report did not describe a separate malware implant. Researchers also did not name the operators or say how many accounts the campaigns compromised.

Hackers Exploit Microsoft 365 Device Code Authentication

In one case, the email’s subject was a single period, and the body offered almost no explanation. A personalized ZIP filename did the work of making the message look like payment advice.

Inside was a file that appeared to be HTML but contained an interactive SVG, a type of image that can run scripts when opened as a browser document. What looked like a security check was actually a redirect.

The redirect led to a counterfeit SharePoint workspace advertising remittance reports and check images. A second campaign used a scheduled electronic payment notice and a ZIP named SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip.

Device-code phishing workflow (Source - HornetSecurity)
Device-code phishing workflow (Source – HornetSecurity)

Its attachment rebuilt a document lure from hundreds of concealed fragments. Earlier reporting on browser-based phishing concealment illustrates why a static scan may miss what a recipient eventually sees, though it does not establish a link between the campaigns.

Device code authentication is designed for devices such as shared displays that cannot easily handle a full sign-in. A user enters a short code on another device to authorize the original request.

In these campaigns, the fake workspace supplied the code under the pretext of unlocking payment documents. When the employee signed in and completed any required MFA, Microsoft issued tokens to the client that initiated the request. That client belonged to the attacker.

The tokens let the attacker act within the permissions granted to that client. Depending on those permissions, corporate email or files could be exposed.

The FBI’s earlier Kali365 account hijacking warning documented the same authorization risk in a separate operation. Hornetsecurity also observed the fake workspace checking its session status, traffic that defenders can correlate with sign-in records.

Detecting and Blocking Device Code Phishing

Security teams should start with Microsoft Entra sign-in logs. Filter Authentication Protocol for Device code, then check whether successful sign-ins match an expected application, account, source and time.

The Original transfer method field can help trace sessions that began with device code authentication even if a later token renewal used another flow. Compare suspicious events with email, browser and network records.

Microsoft’s Conditional Access configuration guide recommends blocking device code flow wherever possible. In Entra, select Authentication flows, choose Device code flow, and set the grant control to Block access.

Start in Report-only mode to check which legitimate workflows would be affected. Keep exceptions narrow, document why each one is needed, and regularly review emergency-access exclusions before and after enforcement.

A new policy is not a substitute for investigating an account that may already be compromised. If an employee entered an unsolicited code and finished signing in, revoke the account’s sign-in sessions and review subsequent activity for unauthorized access.

As earlier coverage of OAuth device code abuse explains, email filtering and domain blocklists address only part of the problem. Employees should verify unexpected payment requests through a trusted channel and enter a device code only for a sign-in they started themselves.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Campaign context
Domain 9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd First sample: verification gate, fake SharePoint workspace and session endpoints
URL hxxps://9l2v3vupv5.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd/l/CqCFCeikrUA First sample: decoded redirect destination
SHA-256 bbf9f563371d6afc449c69546a4ec39e831ca18d3bf3764b7b4c27f525426140 First sample: HTML/SVG redirector
Domain ngjedt0xrv.promtateusachorloadscorp[.]sbs Second sample: fake document workspace
SHA-256 d12b56f405af7fb5d80d828ccd5514e045eb9bfb3428bf77f20deca31ba5c0f7 Second sample: SpwcinBillPaymentReports.zip
SHA-256 81f35c4a218032f44f4681e3f409ee7e024506bffc4446f7a9e7b3ce2d0ee932 Second sample: associated HTML lure
Domain tgg5rqrdcb.synerghylnksloads[.]cfd Joint-check variant: SVG redirect destination
URL hxxps://base-hub-yw7q.p-xxorevv8.workers[.]dev/l/tanaeR_gygko Payment-advice variant: hosted redirect
Domain 5txpm30dqe.krointechbillpaycheckingusalexingto[.]sbs Funds-transfer variant: HTML/SVG redirect destination

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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