Hackers Turn aNotepad Into a Malware Delivery Channel for XenoRAT and NodeLinkRAT Backdoors

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A North Korea-linked hacking group is using aNotepad, a free online note-sharing site, to control infected computers and swap malware on demand.

The campaign targets South Korean policy and security professionals. It delivered the XenoRAT backdoor first and later a new JavaScript tool called NodeLinkRAT.

The attackers did not need to change their phishing files to switch tools. They edited one public note page, and every infected machine picked up the new code. Because of this, a single snapshot of the malware or its server address never shows the full attack.

Researchers at Genians Security Center (GSC) identified the campaign and named NodeLinkRAT in a detailed report published this week. They link the activity to the Kimsuky group with moderate confidence.

Hackers Turn aNotepad Into a Malware

The attack began between September 12 and 18, 2026. The attacker posed as a senior aide to a National Assembly member and wrote to someone who had attended a September 9 seminar.

The email asked the victim to return an honorarium payment form, but the first message had no attachment. The omission was deliberate. The victim replied that nothing was attached, and the attacker then sent a ZIP file through a webmail large-attachment feature.

Inside the ZIP was a shortcut file named like a Hangul (HWP) document. Windows hides the shortcut extension, so the victim saw only “.hwp”.

The file used the same trick seen in LNK files and PowerShell campaigns against Korean users. Opening it started cmd.exe, which launched a hidden PowerShell window.

Spearphishing Email (Source - Genians)
Spearphishing Email (Source – Genians)

The command text was scrambled with character substitution, so words like “curl” and “iex” never appeared in plain text. The script then used curl.exe to pull code from a free web host and ran it in memory.

That second-stage script changed on every connection. It created a scheduled task named CommonMaintenanceHost, which ran a hidden script every 38 minutes.

The script visited an aNotepad page, extracted Base64 text between two marker strings, and executed it. It also opened a real-looking honorarium form as a decoy.

The form asked for a bank name and account number, so a victim who filled it in would hand over financial details.

Payloads Swapped Through the Note Page

GSC collected third-stage code from June to October 2026, and the tools changed in a clear order. On June 18, the note delivered a XenoRAT variant that ran in memory and contacted 103.81.116[.]10.

It posed as “Updater.exe”. This was about three months before the phishing email, so the same setup was likely used on other targets earlier.

In September, the code became simple data collectors. The scripts gathered antivirus names, system details, network settings, and running processes.

They uploaded the results to Dropbox, and later to MEGA cloud storage. A script on September 28 stole document and image files and sent them to a South Korean free hosting site.

Icon Hosted at the Remote Address (Source - Genians)
Icon Hosted at the Remote Address (Source – Genians)

Because the task reran every 38 minutes, files a victim was working on could be stolen almost as they changed. Earlier reports on cloud storage to host scripts showed the same habit of using trusted services.

On October 16, the note delivered NodeLinkRAT. The script downloaded the official Node.js runtime, installed three npm packages, and ran a file called teamview.js from the public Music folder.

The name imitates TeamViewer. The tool connects to 207.148.112[.]166 on port 3000 using Socket.IO. It can run commands, browse folders, upload and download files, compress and steal folders, and capture the screen live.

Traffic is encrypted with AES-256-GCM, but the key is hardcoded as “12345678901234567890123456789012”, so captured traffic could be decrypted.

No single clue settles attribution, so GSC weighed several overlaps. A Dropbox account tied to a similar aNotepad case used an email address that appeared in 2025 phishing against people working on North Korean affairs.

A fake NAVER MYBOX page matched a 2024 Kimsuky phishing page, and the servers sat in the same subnet.

Three XenoRAT variants shared one assembly GUID and a custom encryption key, which suggests one builder. Kimsuky has also used XenoRAT before, as in the case where Kimsuky hackers leveraged GitHub against embassies.

Files for NAVER Login Phishing (Source - Genians)
Files for NAVER Login Phishing (Source – Genians)

GSC lists limits on this conclusion. Much of the infrastructure is public, so a copycat is possible. Korean-language strings may be a decoy. The note page changed often, so some stages may still be unknown.

Blocking Dropbox, MEGA, or aNotepad outright is rarely practical, since businesses use them legitimately. GSC advises looking at behavior instead. Defenders should watch for these signs:-

  • An LNK file inside an archive launching cmd.exe, PowerShell, and curl.exe in sequence.
  • Scheduled tasks with maintenance-style names that repeat at odd intervals.
  • Scripts that fetch a public note page and run the result in memory.
  • Node.js installed under C: or run from a public folder.

Keep early execution logs, because the original LNK is deleted after it runs. Users should be wary of any “resend the attachment” email, and file-extension display should be switched on. These steps echo advice from Kimsuky’s recent LNK campaign coverage.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator
MD5 6985f297c03520a5852734a385322d8d
MD5 7575d230350299cfde0c4f993d761333
MD5 a151531b792b1df1eec8d3a6a8e1ded5
MD5 a15df586bf29e7c1a5db64d603cee382
MD5 cbcb66b530fb4f03d7dc9d55271b2ce4
MD5 ef317291bf88651666133abe84f115f0
C2 IP 103.81.116[.]10
C2 IP 211.223.14[.]75
C2 IP 207.148.112[.]166
C2 IP 185.27.134[.]207
C2 IP 185.27.134[.]120
Domain epaper.dothome[.]co[.]kr
Domain oppsite.dothome[.]co[.]kr
Domain nid.weffm.p-e[.]kr
Domain inmain.22web[.]org
Domain owna.loveslife[.]biz

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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