Fake FMCSA, DAT, and TIMOCOM Portals Attack US Logistics Firms

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Attackers are impersonating carrier-verification, broker-onboarding, and load-board platforms to steal identities and fuel-card credentials, deploy backdoors, and take remote control of dispatch workstations.

US trucking and logistics companies are being targeted by three separate cybercrime campaigns that disguise attacks as routine freight business, according to new research from ANY.RUN.

The campaigns, tracked as HelloFriends, NodeRemote, and Fake Freight Portals, exploit the everyday steps carriers and brokers take on digital platforms: verifying a carrier, onboarding with a broker, reviewing paperwork, or booking a load.

Each one turns a normal business interaction into a way to steal data, plant malware, or gain hands-on access to company systems.

Three cybercrime campaigns targeting American logistics

HelloFriends: Fake FMCSA Notices Harvest SSNs, Fuel-Card Logins, and OTPs

The largest operation by infrastructure, HelloFriends, impersonates the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). ANY.RUN linked approximately 1,430 domains to the campaign in 2026.

The phishing emails are tailored to each target: they name the carrier and include its real USDOT number. Because the sending domains are controlled by the attackers, the emails pass SPF, DKIM, and DMARC checks.

The lure names the carrier and its real USDOT number

Image: The lure names the carrier and its real USDOT number

Victims land on convincing clones of the SAFER and Motus portals, which display genuine carrier records alongside a “NOT AUTHORIZED” warning. From there, the scam escalates step by step:

  1. The victim is asked for an SSN, EIN, date of birth, and contact details, and is told about a $300 “administrative fee.”
  2. They are prompted to “connect” a fleet fuel provider: Relay, Comdata, WEX, EFS, or Fleet One.
  3. A fake provider login captures their credentials. In the observed Relay and Comdata flows, the first password is deliberately rejected so the victim enters a second one.
  4. Finally, the site requests an SMS or six-digit one-time code, which turns the stolen password into a usable account.
The one-time code comes last, which turns a stolen password into a usable account

The stolen data is sent to Telegram through server functions hosted on Vercel. Researchers found message labels such as “FULL OBJECT” and “Hello Friends” marking each stage of the theft.

View the HelloFriends analysis in ANY.RUN’s sandbox

HelloFriends attack flow
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NodeRemote: Broker Paperwork That Installs a Self-Healing Backdoor

The second campaign, NodeRemote, targets dispatch teams and brokers with fake onboarding pages, bills of lading, insurance claims, and rate confirmations.

In one variant, a fake reCAPTCHA copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard and tells the victim to paste it into the Windows Run dialog, a ClickFix-style trick. Other variants deliver VBS scripts disguised as business documents.

In November 2026, an MSI installer pushed through a load-tracking lure was added.

The Run dialog already holds the command

Once it runs, the chain installs a Node.js runtime and an obfuscated main.js backdoor, which persists through scheduled tasks named NodeRemote{GUID}.

The backdoor stands out for how resilient its infrastructure is. It looks up its command-and-control relays from three independent sources:

  • a BNB Smart Chain contract
  • an encrypted DNS TXT record fetched over DNS-over-HTTPS
  • a GitHub gist

This lets operators swap servers without pushing new malware. Between October 25 and November 3, researchers watched six of twelve relay endpoints being replaced. An additional tool, higeleveltask_x64.exe, attempts a UAC bypass through fodhelper.exe and ComputerDefaults.exe.

NodeRemote attack chain

A single compromised dispatch workstation, researchers warn, can expose broker portals, load boards, and email.

Fake Freight Portals: From “Terms and Conditions” to CastleRAT

The third campaign clones the TIMOCOM and DAT freight and load-board platforms. Visitors are asked to review “updated terms and conditions” or download booking documents.

Clicking “View PDF” opens a WebDAV share containing terms_and_conditions.pdf.lnk. The file is a Windows shortcut disguised as a PDF, and it launches an executable from the remote server.

The “PDF” is a shortcut on a WebDAV share

That executable installs a MeshCentral agent, a legitimate remote administration tool. Through it, the operator took several hands-on steps:

  • Retrieved the BitLocker recovery password using manage-bde
  • Added Microsoft Defender exclusions for C:Users and the payload
  • Deployed CastleRAT (also tracked as NightshadeC2) as C:UsersSysmonDrivers.exe
  • Relaunched it with elevated privileges through a UAC bypass

CastleRAT uses a Steam Community profile as a dead-drop resolver to find its command server. Earlier waves of the campaign, seen in May 2026, used NetSupport Manager instead.

Researchers did not observe file encryption. However, they note that having BitLocker recovery keys, weakened defenses, and persistent remote control together creates serious risk for any organization.

Fake Freight Portals attack flow
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Indicators of Compromise (Selected)

Indicator Campaign Role
dotcompanyinfo[.]com HelloFriends Phishing sender / SAFER landing
dot.fmcsa.saferprofilereview[.]info HelloFriends SAFER clone
motus.relayconsolidation[.]online HelloFriends Fake Relay login
highwayonboarding[.]net NodeRemote Fake carrier onboarding
_relay._discovery.foundation[.]forum NodeRemote C2 relay discovery via DNS
update-dat[.]com Fake Freight Portals Fake DAT portal
termsconditionsrelease[.]pro Fake Freight Portals Malicious WebDAV host
45.139.84[.]200:4430 Fake Freight Portals MeshCentral server
87.120.104[.]213:1010 Fake Freight Portals CastleRAT C2

How Logistics Security Teams Can Respond

Based on the research, defenders should prioritize the following:

  • Verify through official channels. Confirm FMCSA, broker, and load-board requests through known contacts, not links in emails.
  • Train dispatch and onboarding staff to recognize ClickFix-style prompts and “PDFs” that open Windows Explorer.
  • Hunt for WebDAV execution, such as rundll32.exe invoking davclnt.dll, followed by programs run from an external share.
  • Watch for unauthorized remote-management agents, especially when they appear alongside BitLocker queries or Defender configuration changes.
  • Monitor scheduled tasks for names like NodeRemote*, and outbound requests to /internal/clients/telemeter.
  • Detonate suspicious files and links in an Interactive Sandbox to see the full chain, from lure to payload to C2, before they reach production systems.
A NodeRemote campaign uncovered in ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox

The Bigger Picture

All three campaigns succeed for the same reason: they look like routine freight work. As carriers, brokers, and shippers move more operations onto digital platforms, attackers are copying those platforms closely enough to slip past email filters and busy staff.

For logistics organizations, the researchers conclude, the defense lies in understanding these attack chains early, mapping the infrastructure behind them, and turning those findings into detections before a fake portal becomes a real breach.

Read ANY.RUN’s full technical analysis

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