Hackers Use GhostMap eBPF Rootkit to Hide IronWorm Malware From Linux Security Tools

Blog WriterCybersecurity News - Original News Source is cybersecuritynews.com


Hackers are using a Linux rootkit called GhostMap to hide IronWorm malware from tools administrators rely on to inspect running systems.

The rootkit can make selected processes, files, and network sockets disappear from routine listings without removing them.

In one test, a malware listener vanished from /proc/net/tcp but remained visible to ss, a Linux utility that reads socket information through a different interface.

GhostMap is the concealment component, not the entire implant. IronWorm is Rust-based malware delivered through compromised software packages.

Earlier reporting on the IronWorm supply chain attack documented its focus on developer secrets, including credentials and API keys.

The new research examined what happens after installation, when a Linux service starts the implant and the rootkit begins changing what local tools can see.

Researchers Dolev Mizrahi and Ivan Kosarev from Aqua Security (Aquasec) identified GhostMap in examined IronWorm and Atomic Arch payloads.

Their November 17 report found evidence that both payloads used the same rootkit implementation, but did not establish that the two campaigns had the same operator.

Hackers Use GhostMap eBPF Rootkit

Aqua examined the executable bundled with [email protected]. When the researchers ran it with root privileges, it copied itself into /var/lib and created a persistent systemd service.

The process launched by that service loaded GhostMap. That distinction matters for investigators: following only the original installer’s child processes would have missed the process that loaded the rootkit. The test did not demonstrate privilege escalation or an unprivileged loading path.

GhostMap abuses eBPF, short for extended Berkeley Packet Filter, a Linux feature that lets small programs run at selected points in the kernel. Aqua counted 13 programs and 10 maps, which hold data the programs use.

Two delivery channels (Source - Aquasec)
Two delivery channels (Source – Aquasec)

As earlier coverage of LinkPro’s Linux rootkit activity shows, GhostMap is not the first malware to abuse eBPF for concealment. Aqua’s contribution was to measure exactly what disappeared and what remained observable.

In six altered directory listings, Aqua found that changing one byte was enough to make the reader skip selected records. The entries were still in memory, and the amount of data returned did not change.

Test processes dropped out of ps output but remained accessible through their known /proc/PID paths. When the rootkit stopped, the processes appeared in the listings again.

The socket tests exposed another limit. IronWorm’s local collector disappeared from /proc/net/tcp in all three checks, but the tested build of ss still showed the listener each time, without identifying its owning process.

The collector stored test records in an extended file attribute called user.d. Aqua verified local storage but did not observe successful external delivery or authenticated remote command execution.

Detecting GhostMap and Investigating Exposed Linux Hosts

Aqua also found matching eBPF program and map names in the Atomic Arch sample. Earlier coverage of the Atomic Arch supply chain traced that campaign to compromised Arch User Repository build scripts.

The overlap gives defenders a reason to look beyond npm package names, but Aqua’s detailed concealment and detection tests apply to the examined IronWorm specimen.

Tracee, Aqua’s open-source runtime security tool, flagged three eBPF programs with application-memory write capabilities when they attached. It also retained all 48 directory-reader calls in the test.

This demonstrated detection, not prevention. Reporting on SANSAR Linux mining malware illustrates a similar lesson: a normal-looking system reading does not mean the activity behind it has stopped.

On potentially exposed hosts, investigators should compare process listings with retained execution records and known /proc/PID paths.

They should also review unexpected systemd services and eBPF attachments, then preserve executable metadata, including extended attributes, before removing suspect components. A matching hash identifies a specific artifact; a path or attribute name alone does not confirm infection.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Artifact or context
SHA-256 0c16ee8a8c1f5b51b01bce924e173030f032912d5b66f1a564fd636a67ddbf5f npm package archive
SHA-256 36abd242ddaa27f0160c539377a0e92cf781c1695137850acc87e3892b436d36 tools/setup and matching installed executable
SHA-256 8795b5215dd06c5366a038a65b18b4dfefa5fd90244a567c3e0b58323103377c GhostMap object recovered from IronWorm memory
SHA-256 6144d433f8a0316869877b5f834c801251bbb936e5f1577c5680878c7443c98b Atomic Arch comparison payload
SHA-256 3607de2597f8955f9a88f36ee43b64d3891b8ef536e99fa098e80169350f7b01 GhostMap object embedded in Atomic Arch payload
npm package [email protected] Package containing the examined IronWorm specimen
Package names atomic-lockfile, lockfile-js, js-digest Atomic Arch delivery chain; affected versions not established in Aqua’s report
File path /var/lib/glugi/glugi Installed executable in the initial test
File path /var/lib/havebi/havebi Installed executable in a later test
Local endpoint 127[.]0[.]0[.]1:8738 IronWorm loopback collector
Extended attribute user.d Collector records stored on the installed executable

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

Give your SOC the alert context on the latest threats to stop incidents quickly -> Integrate Threat Intel from 16K SOCs

The post Hackers Use GhostMap eBPF Rootkit to Hide IronWorm Malware From Linux Security Tools appeared first on Cyber Security News.