Russian-Speaking Hackers Use AI-Assisted Malware and ClickFix Attacks to Target Windows Users

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A Russian-speaking threat actor is running a phishing campaign that uses AI-assisted malware and ClickFix tricks to infect Windows computers.

The operation started in August 2026 and is still active. It has sent nearly a thousand personalized fake document-sharing pages to people in Latin America, Asia, and Europe.

The campaign links three tools: XaocMail, Phantom53, and Havoc. XaocMail is a phishing platform. The name comes from the Russian word for “chaos.” Phantom53 is a stealthy remote control framework that hides its traffic inside normal web lookups.

Havoc is a well-known post-exploitation tool that the attackers load only on victims they find interesting. Together they form a pipeline that moves from one email to full control of a PC. If you want a refresher on how ClickFix attacks work, it is worth reading first.

Analysts at SOCRadar identified the campaign, and the company’s Threat Research Unit report shows that preparation began as early as October 2025.

The attackers tested their malware and Cloudflare setup that month. They spent the first half of 2026 improving their phishing lures and hardening the malware before the August launch.

Russian-Speaking Hackers Use AI-Assisted Malware and ClickFix Attacks

The infection starts with an email that looks like a document-sharing notice. XaocMail builds each message for one victim, using the recipient’s name, a sender name, a company name, and a document type.

The lure copies familiar templates such as Google Docs, Adobe Acrobat, and Office365. The link leads to a page hosted on Cloudflare Workers, which shows a blurred document.

To “unlock” the document, the page tells the victim to press Win+R and paste a command. This is the ClickFix trick. The victim runs the code, so the attackers never need a software flaw.

Campaign Overview (Source - SOCRadar)
Campaign Overview (Source – SOCRadar)

The command can use PowerShell, mshta, or msiexec, and the MSI route is the newest and preferred one. After the command runs, the page removes the blur, so the victim sees the document and suspects nothing.

The same trick has appeared in other recent cases. In one ClickFix MSI installation attack, the intruders spread malware to more than 11 systems after one user pasted a command. The XaocMail campaign follows the same basic pattern but is better organized and easier to scale.

Targets come from technology, finance, education, government, logistics, and manufacturing. Technology and IT firms make up a slightly larger share.

SOCRadar warns that a foothold in an IT company could put its customers at risk. Brazil and Peru were hit hardest, followed by India, Indonesia, and Spain. Most lures were in English, with Portuguese, Spanish, and Indonesian next.

How Phantom53 Hides and AI Helped Build It

The downloaded MSI file pretends to be a tool such as Visual Studio Tools, Python, or Node.js. It installs a private Python runtime and sets up two scheduled tasks with names like OneDriveSyncTask or WindowsDefenderScheduledScan.

One task runs a beacon every 12 minutes. The other runs a watcher every 3 minutes. The beacon sends commands and replies through DNS-over-HTTPS using Google, Cloudflare, and ControlD resolvers, which most networks trust and rarely inspect.

The beacon first checks whether it is running inside a sandbox. It then sends system details, such as the computer name, user name, running programs, and installed security tools, to the attackers.

When the operators find a worthwhile target, the beacon wakes the watcher. The watcher then loads the Havoc Demon directly into memory, which leaves almost nothing on disk.

If defenders block the main domain, a weekly domain generation algorithm creates new ones that the attackers can register in advance.

The AI link is clear in the attackers’ own files. SOCRadar found Claude Code settings folders and 143 task files that follow Claude Code’s naming style. One 117 KB architecture document looked like notes kept by an AI assistant across many sessions.

XaocMail ClickFix (Google Doc) Challenge (Source - SOCRadar)
XaocMail ClickFix (Google Doc) Challenge (Source – SOCRadar)

A Russian-language prompt told a Claude agent to install a test MSI on a virtual machine called “NoAV.” The prompt used an “authorized red team” story to keep the agent on task. This matches other reports of Claude AI agents to automate parts of cyberattacks.

Payload aliases found in the operators’ files show what they want. They target password managers, VPN files, AI tool secrets, SSH keys, crypto wallets, seed phrases, and messaging apps such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal.

Signature-based tools will struggle here, so teams should watch behavior instead. SOCRadar suggests alerts for msiexec.exe started from the Run dialog with a workers.dev link.

Teams should also watch for pythonw.exe launched by Task Scheduler from AppData and for pythonw.exe contacting DoH resolvers.

Staff should also learn never to paste web page instructions into Windows. Recent reports show ClickFix attacks hide malware in new ways, so this habit matters more each month.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Description
IP Address 185[.]224[.]132[.]148 XaocMail landing, FastAPI backend, DNS server
IP Address 162[.]252[.]198[.]204 OPS server (SSH:2222)
IP Address 162[.]252[.]199[.]92 OPS server (Ligolo-ng)
IP Address 94[.]156[.]152[.]7 Operator VPS
IP Address 145[.]63[.]138[.]67 XaocMail stats, Havoc C2
IP Address 91[.]132[.]93[.]251 RevSocks – WSS
IP Address 176[.]9[.]154[.]69 Proxy for credentials hunting
Domain dns[.]timesyncserver-312453[.]com OPS C2 domain
Domain securedoc[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev XaocMail phishing and ClickFix
Domain securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers[.]dev XaocMail phishing and ClickFix
Domain linkrot[.]fypahedupal2-0maz[.]workers[.]dev Link rotator
Domain cdn-analytics-p53[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev Telemetry collector
Domain cdn-analytics-3f4033[.]rosamariaeadeshtvfud[.]workers[.]dev Telemetry collector
Domain sync-node-serv[.]com HavoX
Domain dns[.]cdn-syncnode-server[.]com HavoX
Domain cdn-assets-api[.]cfchk902834[.]workers[.]dev HavoX
Domain cdn-assets-api[.]makeneg458[.]workers[.]dev HavoX
Domain cdn-assets-api[.]kessler-m88[.]workers[.]dev HavoX
Domain cdn-assets-api[.]busykifukek2-8psk[.]workers[.]dev HavoX
Domain a8f2aac37385[.]xyz Phantom53 C2
Domain kfkwrfdd[.]xyz Phantom53 C2
Domain 544504d7fe1e[.]xyz Phantom53 C2
Domain bestutyresdomaonupder[.]com RevSocks – WSS
Domain bestutyresdomaonupder[.]top RevSocks – WSS
Domain bestutyresdomaonupder2324[.]com RevSocks – WSS
URL hxxps[://]securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers.dev/?id=<linkid:8> XaocMail ClickFix page
URL hxxps[://]securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers.dev/m?id=<linkid:8> XaocMail MSI payload
URL hxxps[://]securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers.dev/s?id=<linkid:8> XaocMail PowerShell payload
URL hxxps[://]securedoc[.]mesuttgulerr573[.]workers.dev/h?id=<linkid:8> XaocMail HTA payload
URL hxxp[://]145[.]63[.]138[.]67:8125/up/ Exfiltration URL
URL hxxps[://]linkrot[.]fypahedupal2-0maz[.]workers[.]dev/link?token=7157717581ca4e3dda83e418af25fa448fe98ed2 Rotates securedoc subdomain
URL hxxps[://]gist[.]githubusercontent[.]com/yegeqebige46-creator/b393f36b20ad8aeadcb8a80af70ccc09/raw/da03fd7f1ffacda970a1f3d345bdaeae8c6a7b43/gistfile1[.]txt Phantom53 payload
URL hxxps[://]github[.]com/yegeqebige46-creator/qq Phantom53 payload
URL hxxps[://]github[.]com/yegeqebige46-creator/qq/raw/main/update[.]zip Phantom53 payload
URL hxxps[://]github[.]com/JohnDow22 Operator GitHub account
Email mesuttgulerr573[@]gmail.com Operator’s Cloudflare account
Email rosamariaeadeshtvfud[@]gmail.com Operator’s Cloudflare account
Email nepox3k[@]gtuta.io Operator’s GitHub account
Email yegeqebige46[@]gmail.com Operator’s GitHub account
SHA256 bceeb2d54b6a756c73a3e06617e9e95ad4d8e53da47639bcd6ef3cae98c6da6d HTA XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 79a4cb73983a1facb5db09f1a20cec6e58d91a93044a78aa3ba32ab2190284ed PowerShell XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 0e1c94a8f94158f64558325ddbfd1e1277884fba6fb1f8c381dbd5c742e59fbb build_v4.py (builds Phantom53 MSIs)
SHA256 7055483a77f679ad569c3a9bfe76cdb8e5b96efc44d2bf2a6f08e930add598b0 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 0dcfe51d2521e52a469f5cec6b42bc8e7e37b41df993cce7d739ff3fd248d8b1 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 bd1c005f35e4fd8c61dfa6f20d4c03e082c692e286a3b22dd642369c8d5e3564 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 dbd252becd490ac47e16bff4391ab9e6237c4f7e81ab6784c57fa2eed751f477 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 e9e57a57ee45b8faae2e47affd8cf3a6d0cc1283802108f7298ae1d2ef3b43f0 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 d2d41b249905deae3bd6bcaa547872d747256a7dfa459b509d9db9de8f0ca29b MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 ee5fa33b58d0f2772e091e23de9db24908d970000a88e39fd7d908f30f5e591a MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 a972797cc1a4161f6e2841142b8cace9b781585f9a71b03aa79a9c051b817491 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 47e853092511d9663196e9b36d563a0c3e92ee734f88675c4f375ffcfa5f3db8 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 4efe003a54db8ffbaef6065270eacb0a59479ccc86941517ac7a33344e97bc1d MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 9a2af4b6d9780e08c86ff35030ee1747ea11460cb1dffc868c48e7af6d626546 MSI XaocMail-Phantom53 payload
SHA256 efc4b8c1968c06e598a6f6f98398d44b488198b497291fe30fb792d696b6cb81 adminka
SHA256 4f656834e545c0b44922ce6d8952989c8c0859d8ae8b1f117c06ab07b047e2b4 beacon.pyd
SHA256 8ebb2bf61b48ae7abdcd674413bebd79b30ddd945854e175ba60d56c0a3adf54 watcher.pyd
SHA256 a4ad001c6900176eba43a747ae5d212db6fc78f7ef4e777f276cbbdf8099dbe8 demon.dat (Havoc encrypted)
SHA256 dc57638cb90798835848a9dafec228bef7738def50f4f2db612862e07c5b6f8a demon_dbg.dat (Havoc encrypted)
SHA256 56582934901cce0b618d6a50e54c9db29bf2d444636bcd40b5975a765ecde538 gistfile1.txt (previous version, GUP.exe sideloading libcurl.dll)
SHA256 009099ba10365b44bdb3ecc28dfcbed6a594ec0a0df86931620cdaac9843e611 update.zip (previous version, GUP.exe sideloading libcurl.dll)
SHA256 0aff424f9a02eb9f429119c4caa05e85fc952603549d69849e745293d20235d6 libcurl.dll

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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