Microsoft Teams Vishing Attack Uses Quick Assist to Deploy GoGRPC Backdoor

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A new Microsoft Teams vishing campaign is using fake IT support calls to gain remote access to corporate systems.

The attackers then deploy GoGRPC, a Go-based backdoor that can run commands, collect system details, and maintain access to compromised devices.

The activity appears linked to a threat actor that may serve as an initial access broker for ransomware operations.

Its methods combine inbox flooding, Microsoft Teams impersonation, and Quick Assist sessions to pressure employees into trusting fraudulent support requests.

Analysts at Zscaler identified the campaign while tracking activity from January through June 2026.

Zscaler said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN) that the group has steadily expanded its toolset and increasingly focused on corporate targets.

The campaign is a reminder that remote support tools can become a serious entry point when users are manipulated into approving access.

High-level campaign attack flow and associated tooling for GoGRPC (Source - Zscaler)
High-level campaign attack flow and associated tooling for GoGRPC (Source – Zscaler)

Similar Microsoft Teams support call attacks have shown how quickly a convincing helpdesk impersonation can turn into a wider network security incident.

Microsoft Teams Vishing Attack Deploy GoGRPC Backdoor

The attack often begins with spam bombing, where a victim’s inbox is flooded with unwanted messages. While the employee is distracted, an attacker contacts them through Microsoft Teams and claims to be from the organization’s IT helpdesk.

The caller attempts to persuade the target to open a Quick Assist link and approve a remote support session.

Once access is granted, the attacker can interact with the device and launch PowerShell commands to download additional payloads.

Function trees for GoGRPC backdoor variants (Source - Zscaler)
Function trees for GoGRPC backdoor variants (Source – Zscaler)

This approach abuses trust rather than relying on a software flaw. Employees facing unexpected technical problems may be more likely to accept help, especially when the attacker appears to know their name, workplace, or recent inbox issue.

Organizations should require employees to verify unexpected support requests through a known internal channel before starting a remote session.

Restricting external Teams communications and limiting Quick Assist use to approved IT staff can also reduce exposure to fake IT support calls.

GoGRPC and Expanding Toolset

After the Quick Assist session is established, the attackers use PowerShell to download and execute GoGRPC. The malware creates persistence through a Windows Registry Run value, allowing it to launch again when a user signs in.

Researchers identified four GoGRPC variants named Lep, Giver, Pet, and Kind. They share core backdoor functions but differ in their use of encryption, code obfuscation, victim fingerprinting, and command execution features.

Communication protocol used by BlindDoor (Source - Zscaler)
Communication protocol used by BlindDoor (Source – Zscaler)

GoGRPC communicates with its command-and-control infrastructure through gRPC over HTTP/2, usually on port 443. Later Pet and Kind variants added TLS support, which can make malicious traffic less obvious among normal encrypted web connections.

The backdoor gathers information such as computer name, username, domain details, Windows version, and security software data.

It can then receive commands to run discovery tasks, helping attackers assess whether the victim’s environment is valuable for further intrusion.

The operation has also used BlindDoor, RevSocket, PyGRPC, S3Siphon, and RSOX.

These tools provide capabilities ranging from remote command execution and network tunneling to data theft, increasing the risk that initial access could lead to extortion or ransomware deployment.

Security teams should watch for suspicious PowerShell activity, unauthorized Registry Run entries, unexpected remote support sessions, and unusual outbound gRPC or WebSocket connections.

Monitoring practices described in coverage of PowerShell backdoor delivery tactics can help investigators spot similar staging behavior.

Employees should treat unsolicited Teams messages, calls, and Quick Assist requests as suspicious, even when they appear to come from IT.

Organizations should also prepare incident-response procedures because an early warning may prevent the type of follow-on ransomware activity seen in recent ransomware access operations.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Description
SHA-256 66b2b22397cea219266afb8cbbb28fe93997c1444f642a183ac8fc9ca1fabed5 Giver backdoor
SHA-256 9136ffb749c6cec13b826cd4f25ffdcf170375889feba9fee28dd74c32578f52 Lep backdoor
SHA-256 7dcabb6d07d52b92bbf8d659d1ed373fa780e7839fd3d744826a56fc1cd2372f Giver backdoor
SHA-256 35ea50f16bd5c080c91dbaa3dd4937408ed9563c1d9aa1cd0c751ae58db0eedc Pet backdoor with TLS
SHA-256 759287052b8cc4f4ce16065857cbc9dba72aab218e709d3419483a95092c6f96 Pet backdoor with TLS
SHA-256 f36bfccf944b5d1e5e306958c1a728e38786c042ee4e536cc44c9d43940b1121 Kind backdoor with TLS
SHA-256 51edd14233483bcf36e0b0f31451f28eac681fe3f2036f76c02b7ec1bb17ce33 Kind backdoor with TLS
SHA-256 5d53246b0e6b681bc624739a7bead39a61fb07c0f4474b8170112e829c053f85 RevSocket
SHA-256 65af5c3ba2d00967b25b9165d2d3171fa81f209ee0790299805bb907d492a670 PyGRPC and reconnaissance tool
SHA-256 41748648b71a70431123ec48e38868ff8aad3a7a06f5d781c2d2a4f718e7fd91 MSI file dropping RSOX
SHA-256 f85960dee17ba587b712cd8cdf89042bcd6ba711c3d5d548bef7c7f0988413f5 RSOX
Domain scansec-upd.com C2 server deploying tools
Domain re2.filesdwnload.top C2 server deploying tools, April activity
Domain re8.dowlfles.online C2 server deploying tools, May activity
Domain update19.upldf.online C2 server deploying tools, June activity
IP address 5.253.59.222 Lep C2 server
IP address 94.140.114.192 Giver C2 server
IP address 193.29.57.37 Pet C2 server
IP address 45.86.162.228 Kind C2 server, June activity
IP address 46.30.191.126 RevSocket C2 server, May activity
IP address 46.30.191.60 RevSocket C2 server, June activity
IP address 185.82.126.91 S3Siphon C2 server, January activity
Domain xeds.geranteeg.online RSOX C2 server, June activity

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

ALERT!: 20+ government sites delivered malware to businesses and citizens. See full attack research to check your own exposure.

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