Hackers Use Falcon C2 to Hijack Government Browsers and Steal Passwords, Emails, and Session Cookies

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Hackers have compromised government webmail portals and internal applications using Falcon C2, a browser-based command-and-control framework that steals passwords, emails, session cookies, and private communications.

By planting malicious JavaScript inside trusted websites, the attackers turned routine browsing into an entry point for surveillance and account compromise.

The activity affected government entities in one Middle Eastern country and four Southeast Asian countries between March and May 2026. Targets included foreign affairs, defense, and interior ministries, alongside law enforcement agencies.

The selection points toward intelligence collection rather than widespread financial theft, although the affected countries remain unnamed.

Researchers from Unit42 identified Falcon, also called XG or Xiàng Gē, and documented its browser implants, malicious extensions, and delivery of the Antino backdoor.

Their technical analysis of Falcon shows how attackers combined website compromise with persistent browser access to monitor sensitive government work.

Hackers Use Falcon C2

Falcon begins when someone opens an infected website. An injected script requests a JavaScript implant from the attacker’s server, which generates a differently obfuscated version for each browser session.

The script uses numeric encoding and a decoder to hide its contents before execution. The implant establishes a persistent WebSocket connection protected by TLS.

It can additionally encrypt messages using AES-256-CBC after exchanging key material through RSA. Operators can then execute JavaScript, collect information, and label sessions to distinguish victims. The initial page implant remains limited to its browser context.

Researchers found strong technical similarities with PeckBirdy, including matching delivery patterns and tracking conventions. Earlier reporting on PeckBirdy command and control provides context for these overlaps.

The Falcon login panel is revealed after pressing F9 three times (Source - Unit42)
The Falcon login panel is revealed after pressing F9 three times (Source – Unit42)

Unit42 assessed with high confidence that Falcon and PeckBirdy are variants of the same underlying framework, rather than unrelated tools sharing isolated features.

Browser extensions expand Falcon’s reach. Available for Chrome and Firefox, they disguise themselves as a PDF viewer.

The analyzed Chrome extension requests 40 permissions and access across visited websites, allowing collection of credentials, cookies, browsing history, downloads, clipboard activity, and network traffic.

The extension can also turn a victim’s browser into a proxy. Requests use the victim’s existing credentials and cookies, letting operators access resources under that person’s identity.

Custom commands can retrieve Gmail messages and attachments, while separate functions collect Discord data, Zalo communications, and visible X direct messages.

Falcon’s management interface hides its login until an operator presses F9 three times. Victim-facing servers displayed Tetris or Snake games.

These disguises echo the broader practice of hiding espionage infrastructure online behind ordinary-looking content, although the specific infrastructure and campaigns should not be treated as identical.

Targeted Webmail Intrusions and Antino Delivery

In April 2026, investigators found Falcon injected into a Middle Eastern foreign ministry’s Roundcube portal. They identified 39 affected Roundcube instances within that country.

The malicious script could intercept login credentials and operate inside authenticated webmail sessions, exposing inbox contents and account settings.

At a Southeast Asian police entity, attackers first harvested usernames from an internal application. They then showed selected users a fake Adobe Flash Player update prompt designed to deliver Antino.

This selection reduced unnecessary exposure by restricting the lure to accounts already marked as valuable. Antino is a separate Rust-based Windows implant, not merely another browser module.

JavaScript version of Tetris and Snake hosted on the C2 server (Source - Unit42)
JavaScript version of Tetris and Snake hosted on the C2 server (Source – Unit42)

The sample analyzed by Unit42 uses Microsoft OneDrive for commands, status updates, and file transfers. Previous coverage of Antino cloud control channels describes related Microsoft 365 abuse, but implementation details differ between reported versions.

Another intrusion involved a malicious extension sideloaded in Chrome’s developer mode at a justice-related entity. It communicated for more than three weeks, stole plaintext credentials, and supported a screenshot of an internal document.

Researchers also recorded more than 20 additional document-routing page views during the monitoring period. The extension installation method remains uncertain. Researchers saw references to silent installation utilities but did not recover them.

Defenders should investigate unauthorized developer-mode extensions, unexpected external scripts in internal portals, unusual browser WebSocket connections, and OneDrive activity involving outside tenants. Blocking unapproved extensions and reviewing portal integrity directly address the observed entry points.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Role
C2 domain fonts.tarotfree101[.]top Falcon infrastructure
C2 domain fonts.chrorne[.]com Falcon infrastructure
C2 domain robot.avbliud[.]com Falcon infrastructure
Payload domain microsoft-flash[.]com Payload delivery
Payload domain wps-cn[.]com Payload delivery
Extension ID mbidcmlcbgbphpoacojjbmfpohcimjji Malicious Chrome extension
Payload URL hxxps[:]//microsoft-flash[.]com/download/Adobe_installer.exe Fake Flash update
Browser storage Hm_lvt_$ Falcon session identifier
Cookie pattern Hm_lvt__<session ID> Falcon tracking
Storage/cookie field _domain_google_mark Operator session label
OneDrive path antino/heartbeat/<Bot ID>.json Antino beacon
OneDrive filename pattern command_req_<Bot ID>_<timestamp>.json Antino commands
OneDrive path antino/antino_upload/ Antino file transfers
Installation path %LOCALAPPDATA%Windows GatherOSStateKittmp<8 char>.exe Antino executable
Diagnostic file %TEMP%SDIAG_<GUID>resultresult.ps1 Persistence setup

The SHA-256 values below cover every extension file and the Antino sample listed in the source’s indicator section.

Platform File SHA-256
Chrome/Firefox analytics-core.js 3e535d63af8a95221fb517fa1b3e4a0029d3463d8b767443abdff385ee8cb6e9
Chrome background.js f8b86238e179d88a9979b6f97750a39dda1d07b54d634bc1348fdfb0944a3b92
Firefox background.js 2ebe36f1322b77264a33fded81cd4b8817f93362945070bf0bb5845dd27c0575
Chrome content-script.js 88e8b07bdf294ace0357d35acb7e108c66ba65a2c4ad66351fb8f7806dae0862
Firefox content-script.js 857429faffe0e0747ce299e86eed063ed781b4e403b917ca7e853e89bedf072c
Chrome/Firefox icon128.png 065d18fcfeddbd718c054f4b21c3cde5b9291db921d01f343d7ac0d4b41f29ce
Chrome/Firefox icon16.png 3eab406d841fa22a4b0200c95c1afab068347f835400d5771e8de60aef732016
Chrome/Firefox icon48.png 5711586125909863b91c1b5ff7cf70ef5d35249d67b11d7a23dc864405cddfe2
Chrome manifest.json b6a7be724871ed3e81c986b74d62da8911c82a336c4c1857b35f2446b2d49fda
Firefox manifest.json b33f2e95943e3ff0a72dea1be9fdea03d986bada4def34f6991b3113ec161ad7
Chrome/Firefox offscreen.html 2ed834d92bfefc9d07a9f1a48f986974ae2a29669029f8163a1f6e8706388fcd
Chrome offscreen.js 356b96c2267c5f2d8c07693643626e090b6389318b4ffa74699fa1732da5a00c
Firefox offscreen.js 898656c33effb51e109c548fc213f157f151a870ea64a4601eda74ae75bd3af6
Chrome/Firefox page.html 32af8413cbd38ce8beb257288cb8e6aa2f9b781d56d0f5272bffbcdc22d999f4
Chrome/Firefox page.js e2b6b1becdbcc340121e163b5afdfc5437a480ca132248ed5c7c309c45ac3dbb
Chrome/Firefox sandbox.html 265c2b36060e4b21c25aa86a8bb22d1db5f806117b484774c75c65b5b38222e0
Chrome sandbox.js 66e9098551a1c0c74077d6cf55570e5d307a4a5ef0b0f2053e139394e61c442d
Firefox sandbox.js b3d8ea89b19a87bf2fdd63127086681059f41d67b6e5f8c939f5636a1b2315ce
Chrome twitter-dm.js 3e923f11db08413fca8a3a69d33d8896cfd56309e5179e8604d7fb7110428da2
Firefox twitter-dm.js 24d69139cb2d32598f0f4983876f6320485fac134a66ade59cab76b50b4128f7
Windows flashcenter_pp_ax_install_en.exe 0c39264337a1186b2e765e24073399cbdcba118306614eb411e315887af578bd

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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