Mac users seeking AI tools face a malware trap. Attackers are using fake Claude and ChatGPT installers and sponsored search results to push MacSync, a macOS password stealer.
The campaign relies on persuasion instead of a software flaw. A visitor is told that a download, connection, or verification step has failed, then instructed to copy a command into Terminal. That single action gives the attacker a route into the device.
MacSync is a malware-as-a-service operation, meaning its developers supply the tool and infrastructure to other criminal groups. Researchers said the threat emerged in 2025.
The risk goes beyond a stolen password. MacSync is designed to gather browser logins, session cookies, Mac Keychain data, SSH keys, cloud credentials, messaging sessions, and cryptocurrency wallet information.
SEQRITE said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN) that it can also establish lasting access, leaving personal accounts and workplace systems exposed.
Hackers Use Fake Claude and ChatGPT Installers
The first stage often begins with a search for a desktop AI app. Criminals buy or manipulate search placements and send people to pages that imitate Claude AI, ChatGPT, developer tools, or other trusted services.
A previous report on malicious macOS Google ads shows how paid results can steer high-intent users toward a fraudulent AI download page. Instead of providing a normal application package, the page displays a ClickFix prompt.
These prompts may claim a WebSockets connection needs repair, a CAPTCHA must be completed, or an audio problem requires attention. Victims are asked to paste a helpful-looking command into Terminal, starting the infection themselves.
That technique is effective because it turns the user into the final delivery step. Traditional warning signs, such as an unsolicited attachment, may be absent.
The wider pattern was documented in coverage of macOS ClickFix credential theft, where fake verification pages similarly pushed commands to Mac users. After execution, a shell script launches a background component and unpacks the native MacSync stager.
The stager detaches from the Terminal session, suppresses visible output, and retrieves further instructions from attacker-controlled infrastructure. This layered design lets operators change later payloads.
Stealer Collects Data Quietly
MacSync downloads an AppleScript directly into memory and runs it through a built-in macOS automation utility, rather than saving the script as an obvious file.
The script can display a password request that resembles a system dialog, then collect credentials and other data from the compromised Mac.
The malware packages information, including browser vaults and wallet databases, before sending it to its operators in fixed-size pieces.
If a transfer fails, it retries with increasing delays. After a successful upload, it removes temporary material to reduce evidence for users or incident responders.
It can then deploy a remote-access component that uses the macOS launch mechanism to start after login. A helper program may also request screen-recording permission, giving criminals another opportunity to watch activity or capture sensitive content.
The result is a campaign that can move from a fake installer to account takeover and surveillance. The findings fit a broader rise in AI-themed malware delivery.
In another case, a weaponized ChatGPT download site used sponsored results and fake download choices to target both Mac and Windows users. Familiar branding lowers suspicion when people are looking for new tools or quick fixes.
Users should avoid sponsored links when downloading software and go to a vendor’s official website by typing the address or using a trusted bookmark.
They should never paste a command from a web page, chat, ad, or support message into Terminal unless they fully understand it and have independently verified its source.
Security teams should block the listed infrastructure, investigate unexpected command-line activity launched from browsers, and check Macs for unfamiliar launch items and permission requests.
Resetting passwords alone may not be enough after an infection; affected users should revoke active sessions, rotate exposed keys, and have the device examined for persistence.
Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-
| Type | Indicator | Description |
|---|---|---|
| File name | 9ff32f7c0108e9d27a3b491edf04827b6ca025f44db |
Identified MacSync Mach-O sample file name |
| SHA-256 hash | 9ff32f7c0108e9d27a3b491edf04827b6ca025f44db68a |
MacSync sample hash reported by SEQRITE |
| MD5 hash | 9678f71ea4cccbc3d511dc8d7f24b113 |
MacSync sample MD5 hash |
| SHA-1 hash | 59508d071661ea70fa5fcbe6f9e2fb72506e57df |
MacSync sample SHA-1 hash |
| Code-signing identifier | com.utils.Launcher |
Ad-hoc-signed MacSync stager identifier |
| CDHash | d182eb7cba0ffa42d770d7b0d3499e49f24163a2 |
Code directory hash associated with the sample |
| Staged archive | /tmp/osalogging.zip |
Temporary archive used to hold collected data |
| Status file | /tmp/.httpcode |
Temporary file used to record server response status |
| Persistence file | com.google.keystone.plist |
Possible renamed LaunchAgent persistence file |
| Persistence file | com.apple.sync.plist |
Possible renamed LaunchAgent persistence file |
| C2 domain | drivinguber.com |
Primary command-and-control host |
| C2 domain | asia.newsinweb.com |
Regional fallback command-and-control host |
| C2 domain | usa.newsinweb.com |
Regional fallback command-and-control host |
| C2 root domain | newsinweb.com |
Root domain used for fallback infrastructure |
| Download URI | /dynamic?txd=c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6c522 |
Path used to retrieve the in-memory AppleScript payload |
| Upload URI | /gate?buildtxd=c4f70f37daae63fe47b0c92adf006f8cf50b6 |
Path used for stolen-data uploads |
| HTTP request header | api-key: de62a2f47d1c7dec2997f931a050a615 |
API key observed in MacSync network requests |
| HTTP User-Agent | Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) CFN AppleWebKit/537.36 |
User-Agent string used in command-and-control communications |
Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.
Keep your SOC up to date on active malware & phishing within 24h of their emergence. Try ANYRUN to prevent incidents with early detection.
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