Hackers Impersonate Microsoft Exchange Online Alerts to Trick Users During Microsoft 365 Outage

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Hackers used a real Microsoft 365 outage to send fake Exchange Online alerts claiming that four emails were being held and would be deleted unless recipients restored them.

The messages borrowed a genuine Microsoft incident number and sent users through several redirects to a page that looked like Microsoft’s sign-in screen. The outage was real; the request to recover mail was not.

The phishing emails began arriving on November 13, 2026, a day after Exchange Online users started having trouble accessing their mailboxes.

The disruption also affected Outlook, Teams, SharePoint and other cloud services. Microsoft’s preliminary outage incident report traced the disruption to an infrastructure failure.

The phishing operators took advantage of the confusion, but there is no evidence they caused the outage. Researchers Ernesto Fernández Provecho and Duy-Phuc Pham from Trellix identified the credential-phishing activity through the company’s SecondSight threat hunting service.

They counted 252 emails sent to more than 30 organizations across the United States, Europe, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific in about three and a half hours. Their report describes a web-based phishing campaign, not a confirmed malware infection.

Hackers Impersonate Microsoft Exchange Online Alerts

The emails copied the look of Microsoft service notices, using its logo, sender display names such as “Service Health,” and the real Exchange Online incident number, EX1550543.

As noted in Microsoft’s credential phishing warning, some messages told users they had 24 hours to recover their mail. That deadline gave employees who were already expecting delayed messages a reason to click before checking with IT.

Trellix tracked four waves between 17:04 and 20:38 UTC. The largest delivered 124 emails in 33 minutes. Most subjects paired “Outage” with a short code, while smaller waves used “Restore — 4 messages” or switched to a security checkup.

The messages came from three domains through SendGrid, a legitimate email delivery service. Some also carried an invisible image that let the sender track when recipients opened the email.

The recovery button led first to a tracking link unique to each recipient. From there, visitors passed through pages designed to show automated scanners harmless content while sending people onward.

Email bodies seen in the Microsoft outage campaign (Source - Trellix)
Email bodies seen in the Microsoft outage campaign (Source – Trellix)

A later page passed along the recipient’s email address so the final sign-in form arrived prefilled. That made the prompt look routine, even though the address bar showed a domain unrelated to Microsoft.

The final page used AiTM phishing, short for adversary-in-the-middle phishing. Instead of simply copying Microsoft’s login screen, the site relayed the live sign-in process.

This setup could capture both the password and the session issued after a user completed multifactor authentication, or MFA.

Earlier reporting on Microsoft 365 account hijacking shows why that session matters: someone who steals it may be able to reuse an already authenticated login. The reports do not establish that anyone’s account was taken over in this outage campaign.

Employees who receive an outage alert should verify it through their help desk or an administrator rather than use the email’s recovery button.

Security teams can look for “Outage” subjects alongside phrases such as “messages held after the outage” and check mail and click logs for affected users.

A click alone does not prove compromise. If a user entered credentials, responders should reset the password, revoke active sessions and review sign-in activity.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicators
Sender addresses info@newbooker[.]com
info@planetmaison[.]com
info@moments-notice[.]com
Open-tracking IP 162[.]120[.]17[.]69:8080
Sender and tracking domains newbooker[.]com
em.newbooker[.]com
url.newbooker[.]com
url7489.newbooker[.]com
click.newbooker[.]com
planetmaison[.]com
em.planetmaison[.]com
url2830.planetmaison[.]com
moments-notice[.]com
em4493.moments-notice[.]com
u113727626.ct.sendgrid[.]net
u118250677.ct.sendgrid[.]net
u118254266.ct.sendgrid[.]net
Redirect and phishing domains reallifeaccounting[.]com
uoowsdiftk.mivorantul[.]com
okmjoqzhle.klavontrix[.]com
outagefixed[.]sbs
outagerestored[.]sbs
app.naturekojamibaramet[.]cyou
businessexperience[.]cfd
Click-tracking URL patterns hxxps://url7489.newbooker[.]com/ls/click?upn=[token, 308–324 chars]
hxxps://url.newbooker[.]com/ls/click?upn=[token, 318 chars]
hxxps://u118254266.ct.sendgrid[.]net/ls/click?upn=[token, 304–310 chars]
hxxps://u113727626.ct.sendgrid[.]net/ls/click?upn=[token]
hxxps://u118250677.ct.sendgrid[.]net/ls/click?upn=[token]
hxxps://url2830.planetmaison[.]com/ls/click?upn=[token]
Redirect and phishing URL patterns hxxps://reallifeaccounting[.]com/themelist0.html
hxxps://app.naturekojamibaramet[.]cyou/r/cloupriv/?token=[key]
hxxps://cdicustomapi-[key].businessexperience[.]cfd/
hxxps://businessexperience[.]cfd/common?key=[key]
hxxps://outagefixed[.]sbs/
hxxps://outagerestored[.]sbs/
Open-tracking URL pattern hxxp://162[.]120[.]17[.]69:8080/t/v3.[id].[hash]
Trellix detection names Phish.LIVE.WebContentPattern
Phish.LIVE.ThreatIntel

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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