Anthropic’s Claude Code Reportedly Leaks User Email Addresses Through HTTP User-Agent Headers

Anthropic’s Claude Code is facing privacy concerns after a user reported that the AI coding tool sent their email address to third-party websites through HTTP User-Agent headers during web searches, without permission. The report raises questions about how coding agents handle personal data while carrying out routine tasks.

GitHub user taylor-edwards filed issue #107757 on November 5, 2026, saying they now receive “dozens of scam emails per day.” Their setup included Claude Code version 2.1.318 on macOS, running inside tmux. The user demanded that the behavior be removed entirely rather than controlled through a setting.

The issue does not include a raw HTTP request, a sample header, or steps to reproduce the behavior. While other users reported similar experiences, the public evidence does not establish that the alleged exposure caused the scam emails or affected every Claude Code user.

Claude Code Leaks User Email

A User-Agent header normally identifies the software making a web request. An email placed inside that header reaches the destination website alongside the request. This makes the issue a potential privacy leak through routine web access, rather than a reported theft of Anthropic’s account database.

The discussion points to model-written commands as a possible route. A quoted explanation in the thread describes Claude using an email available in its context as a contact address when writing a curl request. This differs from the malicious traffic routing covered in unauthorized Claude Code relay services, where third parties changed client settings.

In the GitHub issue, poteat said versions 2.1.317 and later include a built-in module called cc-plugin-privacy, designed to block this behavior. The contributor said it is enabled by default and can be disabled through /plugins. However, the original reporter was already using the newer 2.1.318 release.

Several commenters questioned whether the protection worked as intended. Some could not find the module, while others said harmless local tests containing their account email and User-Agent text ran without being blocked. Those tests did not transmit personal data, but they raised questions about whether the guard was active and effective.

A separate comment quoted a Claude Code employee saying Anthropic planned to remove account emails from model context in an upcoming release. That statement also acknowledged gaps in the interim protection. The issue remained open when reviewed.

Teams should review agent-written network commands and verify privacy controls before allowing web access. Earlier reporting on Claude Code security-rule bypasses highlights a related lesson: a configured safeguard should not be treated as proof that sensitive data cannot leave a system.

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