Hackers Infect 17,960 Android Phones With Banking Trojans, Steal 7.6 Million SMS Messages

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Hackers have compromised at least 17,960 Android devices and intercepted more than 7.6 million SMS messages in a banking malware campaign targeting India.

The operation combines fake bank calls, phishing websites, malicious applications, and cryptocurrency mining to steal financial information while quietly exploiting infected phones.

The attackers impersonated 11 Indian banking institutions and two government programs, collecting banking credentials, credit card details, and identity documents.

Stolen messages included one-time passwords, transaction alerts, and account communications, giving criminals information that could support unauthorized transactions and further fraud against affected customers.

Researchers from Group-IB identified seven Android Trojan families within the campaign, which they track under the financially motivated CyberDakait threat cluster.

Their technical investigation, published on October 28, 2026, describes activity targeting India’s financial services sector since July 2025, alongside related victim reports dating to January 2025.

Hackers Infect 17,960 Android Phones With Banking Trojans

The victim count comes from two investigated data theft channels. Analysts identified 2,364 unique devices through installation notifications and another 15,596 through exposed Firebase infrastructure.

Similar risks appeared in earlier Android banking credential theft campaigns involving Ajina, although that operation targeted different markets and should not be confused with CyberDakait.

Example of a public victim’s post about a CPP fraud scheme (Source - Group-IB)
Example of a public victim’s post about a CPP fraud scheme (Source – Group-IB)

Investigators counted exactly 7,611,443 intercepted messages across the campaign. The malware forwarded incoming SMS content to attacker-controlled Telegram bots and Firebase systems in near real time.

Researchers also found stolen card numbers, expiration dates, CVV codes, card grid values, PAN details, Aadhaar numbers, and other personal information. The scam often begins with a phone call shortly after someone receives a new credit card.

A caller posing as a bank employee claims that a “Credit Card Protection Plan” has been activated and will generate charges unless cancelled. The victim receives a link, sometimes through WhatsApp, supposedly needed to complete that cancellation.

Bank-themed phishing pages then direct visitors toward malicious Android APK files hosted in GitHub repositories. Once installed, the initial application displays a fake Google Play update page while delivering another application.

Requests to disable battery optimization help the malware remain active despite Android’s background restrictions. The fake cancellation process gradually requests card details, internet banking credentials, identity information, and photographs.

This staged approach makes each request appear connected to account verification. It also gives attackers more than passwords: they obtain supporting personal information that can strengthen later impersonation attempts against the same victims.

Seven Malware Families Combine SMS Theft With Remote Control

Group-IB classified the samples as cyb3rx, appkjl, godz, d-passive, d-shine, GhostBat, and tenxen. Researchers determined that GhostGrab, previously covered for its banking login theft capabilities, represents an older version of GhostBat rather than an eighth family.

Shared phishing themes alone were insufficient to classify every sample as one malware strain. The families differ in network traffic, database structures, message formats, and command handling.

d-miner infection chain (Source - Group-IB)
d-miner infection chain (Source – Group-IB)

Their common capabilities include SMS interception, message forwarding, call forwarding, and financial data theft through deceptive interfaces. Some communicate through Telegram, others use Firebase, and others send stolen information to remote web servers.

A separate discovery exposed an administrative Android application used to manage cyb3rx infections. Its interface allowed operators to inspect intercepted messages, retrieve phishing data, manage devices, and issue commands.

Supported actions included sending SMS messages, changing forwarding settings, activating call forwarding, and executing custom USSD requests.

The infection chain also includes d-miner, which uses XMRig to mine cryptocurrency without permission. That combination reflects the broader danger of Android malware delivery frameworks, where an initial application can introduce additional threats.

Group-IB observed wake locks, silent audio playback, and foreground services helping the mining component continue operating.

Researchers also found evidence that GhostBat developers used Android phones to write and compile malware. However, the report does not establish that every related Trojan belongs to one operator.

CyberDakait is an analytical cluster linking shared campaign behavior, while differences between families remain important for detection and investigation.

Group-IB reported the identified GitHub accounts and repositories, which were subsequently deactivated. Users should reject banking applications delivered through unsolicited links, verify unexpected calls using official bank contact details, and review SMS permissions carefully.

Anyone suspecting compromise should immediately contact their bank to freeze exposed accounts and prevent further unauthorized activity.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

Indicator type Source-listed values
Phishing domains 81service[.]icu
81service[.]in
Imanagec[.]online
applypointguides[.]in
cancelcardprotection[.]online
cancelcpservice[.]in
cancelmyservice[.]in
cancelservice[.]in
cardforex[.]icu
cardplan[.]online
cardprotections[.]in
cardsprotection[.]in
cardsprotection[.]online
careidf[.]online
carep[.]online
cpmanaged[.]in
cppmanage[.]in
deactivatecpplan[.]in
deactivatecpservice[.]in
hamzaansari1612-ux[.]github[.]io
hdmanage[.]online
icppuser[.]in
icppuser[.]online
icservice[.]online
icuser[.]online
idcare[.]in
idfcare[.]in
idmanagecp[.]online
idservice[.]in
Phishing domains, continued imobile[.]services
imobilelite[.]in
imobileservices[.]online
indeemanage[.]in
indemanage[.]in
indiuser[.]com
inducare[.]online
managebworld[.]com
managecare[.]in
managecare[.]online
managecp[.]co[.]in
managecp[.]com
manageici[.]com
manageinsurances[.]online
manageprotection[.]in
manageprotectionplan[.]in
manageprotections[.]com
myicuser[.]in
myinsuranceservice[.]in
mypnhelp[.]online
mypolicyservice[.]in
pmanage[.]online
pncare[.]online
policydeactivate[.]in
protectcc[.]online
protectionmanage[.]online
rohansingh253641-spec[.]github[.]io
secureici[.]online
servicecpp[.]in
serviceic[.]in
serviceici[.]in
serviceidf[.]in
serviceidf[.]online
servicescard[.]online
serviceshelp[.]online
suraj527526-cmyk[.]github[.]io
www.icppuser[.]online
www.icuser[.]online
www.protectcc[.]online
www.secureici[.]online
www.servicecpp[.]com
www.serviceic[.]com
C2 addresses and associated infrastructure 64.89.163[.]3
78.159.156[.]74
144.31.244[.]184
46.151.182[.]28
ws://64.89[.]163.3:8082
64.89.163[.]4
aptabase[.]fud2026.xyz:8443
accessor[.]fud2026.com
fud2026[.]com
pool.fud2026[.]com:9000
pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000
install-update[.]xyz
app2-update2[.]site
update-app[.]online
Controller API examples hXXp://64.89[.]163.3/idfc/1/api/
hXXp://64.89[.]163.3/pnb/1/api/
Malicious GitHub accounts and repository paths muhaamad852-netizen
gopalmalo36374-beep
rahul3555899-prog
asdg18982-netizen
ranidevisingh901-debug
arushkumar8012-hub
dapu72979-png/bdtch
ks3232896-web/endyyee
uchianawitachizon-prog
cybercodex34-glitch
nobitaxnobi00-dotcom
ankit2560777-gif
sanishaw308-sudo
DeactiveCpp4u
malikchikku11-web
t2118417-max
Administrative controller repository ranidevisingh901-debug/gsafsdfsdf

The report lists the following APK SHA-256 hashes for sample matching and investigation.

Source family label SHA-256
cyberx 0ad853b29a7b3677488018061b109bba59b1a518c8f33b48de31ec532be69856
cyberx 1e60421e83a317cfbfce980fefa926a847964bcc7b047908db65161148d0f624
cyberx 2fbde057c22b6cb517116d6c797c3474de2f4d3bda09037a9f043a6ad843982f
cyberx 3b64eeacacb94d70d498988fe8c6dcc25b133bcaea37fb69dc6f0cc26bde9921
cyberx 5a0cd09adb09a79071a85edc931e02c8d565d6cb7cb58e5b0bffd866e6a2ffb4
cyberx 5f09a31e28b755aab00fbf3669a7369d1205ac5dea85f0b328cb7cd76472e456
cyberx 7e631e9f7791f4648f776419c020ce6c33071c3e195669dd473f1423f098d39d
cyberx 47ae095fd9e5143798a70805a23eb294fc072170dac19c1fa112beca186d844a
cyberx 65e64e65678f849871257dca43fccf8941ee0ee35fe6b72e86a34fe84e752e68
cyberx 80de49a3bd719d62f3b2f24d584a03e3fff3e6ac46ad8bea3c04c8a09071ed3a
cyberx 431ae9a0569c52de8fb5abffcf12919b8d685a879f4e777602ae490dbc2a6baa
cyberx 902803b40aa30d12e60a37680b113d5fc7c79695b7e1b72904fa7de06cf9b27b
cyberx b2bfa29467c1979c044259d4ffe31fc32aa6ef33939779bd3b1ce6bedb44dea9
cyberx b332fa9c08020fbbc5503091b4f4a61ee66a05a0a76abf9a53db9f3d80c4862a
cyberx c9ead89d1bcb09923e1057bb4617726867154d36932ed1c2f82c2466bf11934c
cyberx c36d2b4480034a409f33cdef8d7c3501e75f14d2c5bd9a914a65fd7f3c47d74a
cyberx c6708166e0a6bf3484200fd6dd1569d89e81c36ffd76ff2ab5820b06fd2d5b54
cyberx cb86017411708eb6e5384fc0288b0ec4692ea45ef38586b7c67f99148e1117c3
cyberx cf32addd82960501859f205b0fca8c0b51a40857f71e4a2aee8d70b2433319b7
cyberx cf66a1acebd878d85345377be53ac0b241f517253811ec969c8ff9c751151424
cyberx dfa02773f97f552deb7ff04f5c598a81be4d236fe33adca2a47551485a3aeb2a
godz 9e7cdafcb473d28e134f87d758839265e97b03cf260a186d0e21e1de8aeb7fa8
godz 1b9052d85e12573b4f64f6a47f64803007b19990def1bc62a865de00149a825e
godz 5c0f8bca492c9ee79d6bbd7a532945514670321a605002987f69e3331110e447
godz 53f9fcf3a6fdc59e9a28fd129a32064d78628289eac72d47f53d63cbc434de41
ghostbat 43b217184f7765c699fd887fe22c07c7656483dc088e0214587a4890b2b6aee6
ghostbat 34b75b78b6c575c8a9e71f712be9d90aa35a3a04b48839f86282678107f7876d
d-passive.ExampleAdmin 1bfaaa9aed67552a2c368df3f264ef6878a4e7b43468546db77f095517b15b56
d-passive.TradeSignals 04b35b0c199ef8a13d6ac18dfc6df2ea66a8ed5b6e464dc3a7db0839093882bd
tenxen d72335c0cbbcef002274c1a5087702ed4a91d91a79279104aaf111a33984ae5f
tenxen 4a17171155997754ad735b460be67e344c5939d9cff498ce1d95bf554b93fc1b
d-shine 3b6c2dcba751d1ea05b83fd609e13423dff575705920a1c835ff0d5f92403ffc
appkjl 555e0506979e0b26e4318c0f7dfff0e3dc5c81bb7e3925f2cadd1bdeb843570f

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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